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Rule 36 Decisions at the Federal
Circuit: Statutory Authority
Matthew J. Dowd*
ABSTRACT

Recent commentary has questioned the validity of the US Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's use of Rule 36 affirmances in
deciding appeals from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
One article in particularposits that 35 U.S.C. f 144 and 15 U.S.C.
§ 1071(a)(4) require the Federal Circuit to write an opinion in every
appeal from the USPTO and therefore the court's use of Rule 36
affirmances, particularlywith appealsof cases from the America Invents
Act, is improper. This Article presents a reasoned counterpoint to that
argument. A complete analysis of the statutory text, the legislative
history, the historical context of the statutes, and other considerations,
including other applicable Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
delegation of authority under the Rules Enabling Act, and traditional
deference afforded the judiciary in how it applies procedural rules,
support the conclusion that Rule 36 affirmances are entirely within the
authority and discretion of the court. A contrary conclusion would rest
on a slender reed of statutory text and would create a rare situationperhaps the only instance-in which Congress has directly dictated
procedure for the federal courts of appeal since the enactment of the
Rules EnablingAct.
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I. INTRODUCTION

An intriguing argument has recently been advanced, based on a
purportedly novel theory, about the permissibility of so-called "Rule 36
affirmances."I Professor Dennis Crouch and others have argued that
the use of Federal Circuit Rule 36 ("Rule 36") affirmances by the US
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in appeals from the US Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) violates statutory mandates

3
established by Congress in 35 U.S.C. § 1442 and 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4).

As the argument goes, because those two statutory provisions state that

Dennis Crouch, Wrongly Affirmed Without Opinion, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561,
1.
561-62 (2017).
35 U.S.C. § 144 (2018) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2.
shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and
Trademark Office. Upon its determination the court shall issue to the Director its mandate and
opinion, which shall be entered of record in the Patent and Trademark Office and shall govern the
further proceedings in the case." (emphasis added)); Crouch, supra note 1, at 561-62.
15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2018) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
3.
Circuit shall review the decision from which the appeal is taken on the record before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. Upon its determination the court shall issue its mandate and
opinion to the Director, which shall be entered of record in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and shall govern the further proceedings in the case. However, no final judgment
shall be entered in favor of an applicant under section 1051(b) of this title before the mark is
registered, if such applicant cannot prevail without establishing constructive use pursuant to
section 1057(c) of this title." (emphasis added)); Crouch, supra note 1, at 561-62.
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the Federal Circuit "shall issue to the Director [of the USPTO] its
mandate and opinion," the Federal Circuit is obligated to write an
opinion in every such appeal, which provides the court's reasons for
affirmance, rather than simply a one-word affirmance by means of Rule
36.4

The argument, while not new, exhibits some superficial
attractiveness.
It reads like a straightforward, text-based
interpretation of the statutes. The proponents of the argument suggest
there is no room for doubt or debate.5 The argument also seemingly
validates increasing concerns raised by certain members of the patent
bar about the use of Rule 36 affirmances by the Federal Circuit. 6
Upon a more thorough analysis, however, the question of the
validity of Rule 36 affirmances runs deeper than a quick read of the
statute. This Article presents a comprehensive and reasoned analysis
to demonstrate that the Federal Circuit is well within its authority to
issue Rule 36 affirmances for USPTO appeals. A complete analysis of
the statutory text, the historical context of the statute, separation of
powers considerations, and other factors supports the conclusion that
Rule 36 affirmances are entirely within the authority and discretion of
the Federal Circuit. A contrary conclusion would rest on the slender
reed of misreading the statutory text and would create a rare
situation-perhaps the only instance-in which Congress has directly
dictated a procedural requirement for the federal courts of appeal since
the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act.
This Article endeavors to put to rest the continued confusion
about the Federal Circuit's authority to use Rule 36 affirmances. The
resurgence of the argument that the Federal Circuit cannot issue Rule
36 opinions has received greater attention with the increased number
of appeals from the USPTO. But it is not a new argument, and the
4.
Crouch, supra note 1, at 562.
5.
See Crouch, supra note 1, at 562, 571 ("Quite simply, Rule 36 judgments are not
opinions and thus do not satisfy the opinion requirement.... The statutes are so straightforward
that it appears almost laughable to argue that no opinion is required.").
6.
See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, The Federal Circuit Strides Forward with No-OpinionJudgments, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 14, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/09/federal-circuitjudgments.html [https://perma.cc[UW7R-YKPZ]; Peter Harter & Gene Quinn, Rule 36: The Ides of
March
for
the
Federal
Circuit?,
IPWATCHDOG
(Mar.
1,
2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/01/rule-36-ides-march-federal-circuit/id=78985/
[https://perma.ccV8J9-AGVF]; Peter Harter & Gene Quinn, Does the Federal Circuit's Use of Rule
36 Call into Question Integrity of the Judicial Process?, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/14/federal-circuit-rule-36-integrity-judicialprocess/id=78261/ [https://perma.ccIM4Q9-PBQY]; Peter Harter & Gene Quinn, Rule 36:
Unprecedented Abuse at
the Federal Circuit, IPWATCHDOG
(Jan.
12,
2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/12/rule-36-abuse-federal-circuit/id=76971/
fhttps://perma.cc/PDQ2-WHYU ] ("In the patent world the Federal Circuit is further placing
America's inventors under siege as the result of their mercurial use of Rule 36.").
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Supreme Court has, for at least twenty-five years, declined invitations
to grant cert petitions based on this argument.
The Article starts with a brief background and history of written
judicial opinions, which provides useful context for understanding the
purpose of 35 U.S.C. §144 ("§ 144"). The background includes an
examination of the Federal Rules Enabling Act, which statutorily
delegated judicial rulemaking to the judiciary itself. The background
also considers the growth of unpublished, or nonprecedential, opinions.
Next, the Article turns to the statutory analysis of § 144. The
statute's plain text does not command the Federal Circuit to write an
opinion, with reasons, in every case appealed from the USPTO. All the
statute requires is that the court's mandate and opinion-assuming one
7
is written-are "issue[d] to the Director" of the USPTO. The textual
command to issue to the Director instructs the court to transmit the
decision and mandate to the USPTO. Had Congress wanted to impose
the unusual requirement of having to write an opinion in every USPTO
appeal, Congress could have been explicit; it could have adopted
statutory language widely used by states that require courts to issue
written opinions with reasons stated.8 Congress also could have taken
a cue from language used in establishing the former US Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit in 1893 or the former Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) in 1929. In those instances,
Congress expressly stated that "the opinion of the said court of appeals
in every case shall be rendered in writing, and shall be filed in such case
as a part of the record thereof."9 Congress did not include any such
express requirement in § 144 or 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) ("§ 1071(a)(4)").
By 1984-when the "issue to the Director" language was added
to § 144 and § 1071(a)(4)-affirmances without opinions were routine
dispositions in the federal courts of appeal. Since 1967, Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 36, promulgated pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, has authorized federal courts of appeals to decide
cases without writing an opinion. 10 FRAP 36 has the force of law, like

35 U.S.C. § 144.
7.
See infra Section III.A.1.
8.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 3, 45 Stat. 1475 (1929); Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74,
9.
§ 10, 27 Stat. 436 (1893). Even these statutes leave open the question as to what was required in
the opinion, as they say nothing about requiring the court's reasoning or bases for its opinion. See
infra Section III.A.1. Thus, these earlier statutes may merely be directives to ensure that an
opinion from the court, if given, would be in writing and not delivered orally from the bench. Like
the current § 144, they did not expressly command the court to write an opinion in every case and
did not expressly require the court to provide the reasons for its decision. But see infra note 117
(discussing provisions in state constitutions).
FED. R. APP. P. 36; see also Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064
10.
(1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018)).
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an act of Congress, and courts have repeatedly rejected challenges to
Rule 36 affirmances without an opinion." The Supreme Court has also
accepted the practice, upholding the affirmance when faced with a
challenge to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's local rule in
the 1960s that permitted its version of Rule 36 affirmances.1 2 Other
courts of appeals have since implemented similar rules and rejected
challenges to the rules.13 Even the CCPA-the Federal Circuit's
predecessor-would, when warranted, dispose of an appeal with a twoline affirmance.14
Historical context and legislative history also confirm that the
1984 amendments to § 144 and § 107 1(a)(4) were not intended to repeal
FRAP 36 and impose a novel requirement that the Federal Circuit must
write an opinion with reasons in every USPTO appeal. Rather, the
amendments were proposed by Chief Judge Howard T. Markey as
technical amendments to the recently enacted Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, which created the Federal Circuit. 15 The
amendments to § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) were intended to conform
appeals from the USPTO with other appeals and general appellate
practice. It was Chief Judge Markey who, just a few years later, spoke
approvingly of Rule 36.16 It is highly improbable that Chief Judge
Markey would approve Rule 36 if that rule violated the very statutory
amendment he proposed to Congress just a few years prior.
In fact, it would have made little sense for Congress to pass a
technical amendment to require what the Federal Circuit was already
doing. At the time, the Federal Circuit's Local Rule 18(a) stated that
the court could dispose of appeals by a published or unpublished
opinion.1 7 And the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure required the
court to produce a mandate.18
In short, the only reasonable interpretation of § 144 and
§ 1071(a)(4) is that they do not require written opinions in every appeal
from the USPTO. Such an interpretation would create an incongruent
situation where the court could issue a Rule 36 affirmance in a district
court appeal-or any other type of appeal for that matter, such as from
the International Trade Commission-but could not do so for a USPTO
11.
See infra Section ILC.I.
12.
See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (per curiam); infra Section
I.C.1.
13.
See cases cited infra note 88.
14.
See infra Section III.B.
15.
See infra Section III.D.
16.
See The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, 128 F.R.D. 409, 420 (1989).
17.
See infra Section III.A.1.
18.
See infra Section III.A. 1.
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appeal. Instead, the statute is a procedural directive, instructing the
court to transmit its opinion to the USPTO director, assuming an
opinion is written.
To be clear, this Article analyzes only the Federal Circuit's
authority to issue Rule 36 affirmances. The court has sound statutory
authority to do so, but whether it should use Rule 36 as much as it has
in recent years is a much different issue, and one to be fully analyzed
in a separate article.

II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
To understand Rule 36's place in the judicial decision-making
process, a brief review of the historical development of judicial opinion
This background provides the necessary
writing is necessary.
understanding to accurately interpret the statutory provisions and to
accurately understand the implications of the argument that the
Federal Circuit's Rule 36 affirmances are unauthorized for USPTO
appeals. This Part first details what a Rule 36 affirmance entails. The
Part next examines the Rules Enabling Act and its implications for
interpreting statutes purporting to establish requirements of judicial
opinion writing. The Part then briefly explores the historical practice
of appellate opinion writing, including the more modern creation of the
"unpublished" opinion.
A. What Is a Rule 36 Disposition?
Before examining the history of the statutes and rules governing
written judicial decisions, a preliminary review of Rule 36 and certain
terminology is warranted.
FRAP 36 provides as follows:
(a) Entry. A judgment is entered when it is noted on the docket. The clerk must
prepare, sign, and enter the judgment:
(1) after receiving the court's opinion-but if settlement of the judgment's form is
required, after final settlement; or
(2) if a judgment is rendered without an opinion, as the court instructs.
(b) Notice. On the date when judgment is entered, the clerk must serve on all parties
a copy of the opinion-or the judgment, if no opinion was written-and a notice of
19
the date when the judgment was entered.

This rule applies to all federal courts of appeals, and, as
explained below, the rule is approved by the Supreme Court and
Congress. The rule expressly recognizes that a judgment in an appeal
19.

FED. R. App. P. 36.
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may be "rendered without an opinion." 20 Thus, under FRAP 36, all
federal courts of appeals may enter a judgment without the need for a
written opinion. By logical extension, all federal appellate courts are
implicitly authorized to dispose of cases without providing the
reasoning or bases of their decisions. 2 1 As the advisory committee notes
explain, FRAP 36 embodies the "typical rule" that was in place in the
various appeals courts when the FRAP were enacted in 1967.22
Current Rule 36 reads as follows:
The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, citing this rule, when
it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion would have
no precedential value:
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based on
findings that are not clearly erroneous;
(b) the evidence supporting the jury's verdict is sufficient;
(c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the
pleadings;
(d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under the standard
of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or
(e) a judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.2 3

On its face, Rule 36 does not expand the authority granted to the
court by FRAP 36. Instead, Rule 36 simply specifies the instances in
which affirmance without an opinion is appropriate. Rather than
expand what the court can do, Rule 36 actually limits the broader
authority-at least broader based on the text-of FRAP 36 by limiting
the use of an affirmance without opinion to five situations. Rule 36 also
restricts the use of decisions without opinions to "affirmances," which
is not a limitation included in FRAP 36.
One further definitional point is needed in order to understand
the historical and statutory aspects of Rule 36 affirmances.
For
purposes of this Article, the term "Rule 36 affirmance" refers

&

20.
Id.
21.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2018) (giving the federal appellate courts broad authority to
issue rulings "as may be just under the circumstances").
22.
FED. R. APP. P. 36 advisory committee's note to the 1967 adoption.
23.
FED. CIR. R. 36. For additional background, see Justin A. Hendrix & Jacob A.
Schroeder, Surf's Up: Is the Federal Circuit Using Rule 36 to Rubber-Stamp the PTAB's Decisions
in IPRs?, FINNEGAN (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.finnegan.comlen/insights/blogs/federal-circuitip/surfs-up-is-the-federal-circuit-using-rule-36-to-rubber-stamp-the-ptabs-decisions-in-iprs1.html [https://perma.cclV3AN-M9LM]; Rachel Hughey, How To Get To Federal Circuit Rule 36,
LAW360 (July 29, 2015, 10:19 AM), https://www.1aw360.comlarticles/684264/how-to-get-to-federalcircuit-rule-36 [https://perma.ce/Y9GW-M543]; Anthony C. Tridico, Timothy P. McAnulty
Kassandra M. Officer, PTAB Affirmance at the Federal Circuit, FINNEGAN (June 2015),
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=b20beda3-76a3-4f34-b1d8a0a0f449364f [https://perma.cc/658V-XJW4].
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specifically to the single-line decisions affirming the lower tribunal's
decision that are issued pursuant to FRAP 36 or Rule 36.
In contrast, the term "summary affirmance" generally refers to
an affirmance prior to briefing on the merits. 24 A summary affirmance
"is appropriate, inter alia, when the position of one party is so clearly
correct as a matter of law that no substantial question regarding the
outcome of the appeal exists." 25 Not dictated by any procedural rule, a
summary affirmance is a concise opinion used by the Federal Circuit
and other circuits to dispose of appeals prior to full briefing on the
merits or prior to oral argument. 26 The Federal Circuit generally issues
a written opinion explaining the reasons for granting summary
affirmance, which is another distinction between a Rule 36 affirmance
and a summary affirmance. 27
This distinction has important implications about the
precedential value of a Rule 36 affirmance versus that of a summary
affirmance. A Rule 36 affirmance offers no explanation of the court's
decision, other than recording that the court agrees with the judgment
of the lower tribunal. Indeed, "a Rule 36 judgment simply confirms that
the trial court entered the correct judgment. It does not endorse or
28
reject any specific part of the trial court's reasoning." For this reason,
29
a Rule 36 affirmance generally will not trigger the mandate rule.
For purposes of this Article, the terms "summary affirmance" and "Rule 36 affirmance"
24.
are not used interchangeably, unless citing particular usage from another source. The term
"summary affirmance" has frequently been used to refer to a "Rule 36 affirmance." See, e.g.,
Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 676 F.3d 1051, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O'Malley, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (referring to Rule 36 as "our rule permitting summary
affirmance of appeals"). Such usage is not necessarily incorrect, but this Article maintains the

distinction is preferable and more precise. See Aaron S. Bayer, 'IKnow a Frivolous Appeal When I
See One', NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 2012, at 1 (summarizing the courts of appeals' various approaches
to summary affirmances).

Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Taxpayers
25.
Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that summary
affirmance is proper when "the merits of [the] case are so clear that expedited action is justified"
and "no benefit will be gained from further briefing and argument of the issues presented").
See Joshua, 17 F.3d at 380; Chem. Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331, 335 (Fed.
26.
Cir. 1984) ("The grant of summary judgment is sua sponte hereby summarily AFFIRMED. . . .").
To be clear, however, the term "summary affirmance" has also been used to refer to certain
affirmances even after briefing on the merits. See, e.g., Mossburg v. Maryland, 676 F. App'x 211,
212 (4th Cir. 2017) (unpublished), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 102 (2017); infra Section III.C.
See, e.g., Kenney v. United States, No. 2013-5003, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 4504, at *127.
3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 2013) (granting motion for summary affirmance because the complaint in the
Court of Federal Claims failed to set forth a jurisdictional basis); Amodeo v. Dep't of Transp., Fed.
Aviation Admin., 788 F.2d 1549, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (granting fees based on prior summary
affirmance).

Rates Tech., Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 688 F.3d 742, 750 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
28.
See TecSec, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 731 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("Here,
29.
the mandate rule does not preclude TecSec from challenging claim construction."). The mandate
rule is, in essence, a specific application of the law of the case doctrine. See, e.g., United States v.
Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[Ilt is indisputable that a lower court generally is 'bound to
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Depending on the issues litigated, a Rule 36 affirmance also may not
trigger collateral estoppel. 30
Several circuit courts also have local rules for summary
dispositions. 31 In addition, other circuits have rules that specifically
permit "summary affirmances," which do little more than state the
decision of the court. 32 Summary affirmances are routinely used by
federal courts to dispose of appeals prior to briefing on the merits. 33
Note again, however, that a "summary affirmance" in this context is
slightly different than a Rule 36 affirmance because the summary
affirmance provides some additional statement other than merely

-

carry the mandate of the upper court into execution and [may] not consider the questions which
the mandate laid at rest."' (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939)
(alteration in original))).
30.
See TecSec, 731 F.3d at 1344 ("Because claim construction was neither actually
determined by nor critical and necessary to our summary affirmance [i.e. Rule 36 affirmance] in
the IBM appeal, collateral estoppel does not preclude the present challenge.").
31.
See, e.g., 8TH CIR. R. 47A ("SUMMARY DISPOSITION. (a) On Motion of Court. The
court on its own motion may summarily dispose of any appeal without notice."); 9TH CIR. R. 3-6;
10TH CIR. R. 27.3.
32.
E.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36.3 ("36.3. Summary Opinions. If all judges on a panel of the Court
agree following oral argument that an opinion in a case would have no precedential value, and
that summary disposition is otherwise appropriate, the Court may decide the appeal by summary
opinion. A summary opinion identifies the decision appealed from, sets forth the Court's decision
and the reason or reasons therefor, and resolves any outstanding motions in the case. It does not
discuss the facts or elaborate on the Court's reasoning."); 6TH CIR. R. 36 ("Entry of Judgment
Dispositions in Open Court[:] The court may announce its decision in open court when the decision
is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that a written opinion would serve no
jurisprudential purpose. The clerk will enter a signed written judgment in accordance with the
panel's decision from the bench. A person may pay a fee to obtain a recording of the decision
announced from the bench."); 9TH CIR. R. 36-1 ("Each written disposition of a matter before this
Court shall bear under the number in the caption the designation OPINION, or MEMORANDUM,
or ORDER."); 10TH CIR. R. 36.1 ("Orders and judgments. The court does not write opinions in every
case. The court may dispose of an appeal or petition without written opinion. Disposition without
opinion does not mean that the case is unimportant. It means that the case does not require
application of new points of law that would make the decision a valuable precedent."); D.C. CIR. R.
36(d) ("Abbreviated Dispositions. The court may, while according full consideration to the issues,
dispense with published opinions where the issues occasion no need therefor, and confine its action
to such abbreviated disposition as it may deem appropriate, e.g., affirmance by order of a decision
or judgment of a court or administrative agency, a judgment of affirmance or reversal, containing
a notation of precedents or accompanied by a brief memorandum. If the parties have agreed to
such disposition, they may so state in their briefs or may so stipulate at any time prior to decision.
In any such case the court will promptly issue a judgment unless compelling reasons dictate
otherwise.").
33.
See, e.g., Peavey v. Holder, No. 09-5389, 2010 WL 3155823, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9,
20 10) (per curiam) (granting the agencies' motion for summary affirmance where "[a]ppellant has
not demonstrated that any agency 'improperly withheld' a record within its possession" and "the
district court correctly concluded that the agencies conducted searches reasonably calculated to
uncover all relevant documents"); Lewis v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 09-5225, 2010 WL 1632835,
at *2 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("The district court properly determined
that [one of plaintiffs requests] was beyond the scope of the litigation. Construing appellant's
complaint liberally, the complaint does not adequately notify the government that appellant
sought to litigate [that request] in the district court, and appellant failed to move to amend his
complaint."); Roman v. NSA, 354 F. App'x 591, 592 (2d Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (summary order).
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"affirmed," even if the additional statement does not say much about
the basis for affirmance.
The distinction also aids in understanding the development of
published versus unpublished (or precedential versus non-precedential)
opinions. During the 1960s and 1970s, much debate focused on whether
courts should be permitted to produce "non-published" decisions, which
was followed by debate on whether parties should be permitted to cite
unpublished decisions. In the 1970s, if a case was not published, it was
functionally equivalent to not existing, and thus, an unpublished
decision was much less likely to be cited back to the court. But this has
changed in the internet era.
B. The Rules EnablingAct and the FederalRules of Appellate
Procedure
Beyond Rule 36 specifically, it is also important to understand
the procedural authority under which federal courts of appeals operate
and how the courts' rules-both the FRAP and the local rules of the
courts of appeals-are enacted. The argument that Congress forbade
the use of Rule 36 affirmances in USPTO appeals does not account for
the legal force of the FRAP. Moreover, the correct interpretation of
§ 144 must take account of significant issues about separation of powers
and deference to the judiciary on procedural issues that are implicated
when Congress purports to enact legislation prescribing court
procedure, particularly in a key judicial role of substantive decisionmaking and opinion writing.
Article III courts are authorized by the Constitution but subject
to control by Congress. Congress "may from time to time ordain and
establish" "such inferior Courts" of the federal judiciary as it deems
necessary. 34 From a constitutional perspective, Congress has arguably
broad authority to limit what the judiciary can do and has the authority
to eliminate courts of appeals, if it so chooses. Unsurprisingly, scholars
have debated the extent of Congress's authority over the judiciary once
35
the judiciary is established.
Not debated is the fact that Congress has delegated to the Article
36
III branch much of the authority concerning judicial procedures. With

U.S. CONST. art. III.
34.
For instance, a vast body of scholarship explores issues such as jurisdiction stripping.
35.
H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-StrippingReconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1044Richard
e.g.,
See,
45 (2010); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts and
the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and
Common Sense in the Interpretationof Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633, 1637 (1990).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075, 2077 (2018).
36.
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the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress authorized the federal courts "to
make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting [of]
business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to
the laws of the United States." 37 In 1934, Congress passed the Rules
Enabling Act, which further delegated rulemaking authority to the
judiciary. 38 In its current statutory form, chapter 131 of title 28, the
Rules Enabling Act provides that the federal courts "may from time to
time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business," with the caveat
that "[s]uch rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of
practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title [i.e.,
28 U.S.C. 2072]."39 Beyond chapter 131 of title 28, there are few, if any
provisions in the United States Code that establish specific rules of
procedure governing the federal courts of appeals. 4 0
Sections 2073 and 2074 of the Rules Enabling Act codify the
procedures by which the rules governing the judiciary are proposed and
approved. 41 The Judicial Conference establishes various committees for
"recommending rules to prescribed." 42 After proposed rules are
approved by the Judicial Conference, they are transmitted by the
Supreme Court to Congress for final approval. 43 The proposed rules are
approved and become effective if Congress takes no action on the
proposed rules by a certain deadline. 44 In short, rules promulgated in
accordance with the Rules Enabling Act, including the FRAP, have the
approval of both the Supreme Court and Congress, and such rules are
deemed to have the force of law, just as any other act of Congress.45
In addition to the FRAP, each circuit court can establish its own
local rules. 46 The local rules are promulgated "by a majority of its
judges in regular active service [and they] may, after giving appropriate
public notice and opportunity for comment, make and amend rules
governing its practice." 47 Moreover, a court's local rule "must be
37.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789).
38.
Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (2018)).
39.
28 U.S.C. § 2071.
40.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49, 1651-2113 (chapter 3 of title 28 covers the organization,
composition, and the like of the courts of appeals, and part V of title 28 covers Procedure).
41.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2074.
42.
28 U.S.C. § 2073.
43.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2704(a).
44.
See id. (Congress retains power to reject Federal Rules submitted to it by the Supreme
Court).

45.
power over
Act).
46.
47.

See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965) (noting that Congress exercises its
federal procedure through its delegation to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling
See FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1).
Id.
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consistent with-but not duplicative of-Acts of Congress and rules
adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072."48 In general, a rule set forth in the
FRAP generally displaces a law concerning the same issue, assuming
that the rule does not impermissibly address a substantive right. By
statute, the federal rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right." 4 9 Further, "[a]11 laws in conflict with such rules
50
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
Based on the implementation process, the federal rules have a general
presumption of validity.5 1 No federal rule has ever been invalidated by
the Supreme Court. 52 Furthermore, no court has ever suggested that
FRAP 36 is invalid.
In contrast, the local rules do not receive the same approval of
Congress or the Supreme Court. Local rules of appellate procedure are
implemented entirely by the individual courts, such as the Federal
Circuit. A local rule therefore does not receive the same presumption
of validity, or at least not to the same degree, as a rule within the FRAP.
53
There have been occasions where a local rule was held invalid. Even
so, no court has ever invalidated a local rule authorizing decision
without reasons or summary dispositions. In other words, no court has
ever invalidated a local rule that was implemented pursuant to FRAP
36, which expressly allows for decisions without reasons.
C. A Brief HistoricalBackground of Appellate Opinion Writing in the
FederalCourts
The history of federal appellate courts and appellate opinion
writing is far too extensive to explore in meaningful detail in this short
Id.
48.
Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
49.
2072).
§ 2070(b); accord Kenyon v. United States, 676 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Thus
50.
Congress has stated that the rules of procedure enacted by the Supreme Court replace any laws
in conflict therewith, as long as those laws do not involve substantive rights.").
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 422 (2010);
51.
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1941); Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A
Comment on Paul Carrington's"Substance"and"Procedure"inthe Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 1012, 1041-42 (1989); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1027 (1982); Paul D. Carrington, "Substance"and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 296 (1989); John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 693, 697-98, 718 (1974).
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 407 ("Applying that test, we have
52.
rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us.").
See Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
53.
of the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan of the Eastern District of
rule
the local
Texas "is substantive in nature and therefore requires congressional approval as mandated by the
Supreme Court in Alyeska"); Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1975)
(holding that the Western District of Pennsylvania's Local Rule 34(b) was invalid).
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Article. 54 It is worthwhile, however, to provide at least a cursory
overview of the history of the appellate opinion in federal courts. This
history encompasses two aspects. First, the traditional practice of US
courts has emphasized written opinions, but not to the exclusion of
more concise means of disposing of appeals, including without any
opinion at all. Second, the rules governing appellate procedure have
likewise for many decades authorized the courts of appeals to dispose
of appeals without issuing a written opinion.
1. Historical Practice of Appellate Opinion Writing
The norm in the US appellate judiciary has generally been to
favor written opinions over oral opinions and over dispositions without
any opinion, either written or oral. Nonetheless, oral opinions and
dispositions without an opinion have been a common practice in
American courts from the earliest days. Early in US history, many
appellate decisions were decided from the bench without a written
opinion since there was no requirement that federal courts issue
written opinions.5 5 The early Supreme Court did not issue written
opinions in the process used today; rather, the Court's decisions were
summarized and distributed by the early unofficial reporters, with
varying degrees of accuracy and timeliness. 56 As one academic noted:
For a short time, in the nation's early years, the Supreme Court justices rendered
their opinions orally, like their English counterparts. Eventually, however, the
justices began to write out their opinions before reading them in court. And
ultimately, the Court adopted the practice of having one judge write the opinion for
the majority, without presenting it orally. 5 7

54.

For literature on the history of opinions, see generally HON. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT,

OPINION WRITING (2d ed. 2009); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION:
INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES (2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING

(2013).
55.
See Harrison, supra note 35, at 230 ("Neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act
of 1789 provided for the delivery of written opinions, let alone their public distribution.").
56.
The first two reporters of the Supreme Court were "unofficial" reporters and the
reports varied in quality and accuracy. The first, Alexander Dallas, was the reporter for the
landmark Chisholm v. Georgiadecision in 1793, but he did not report the case until five years later
after the Eleventh Amendment was adopted. See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court
Reporter:An InstitutionalPerspective on Marshall CourtAscendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1294
(1985); John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredel's Dissent in Chrisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73
N.C. L. REV. 255, 262 (1994); Linda Greenhouse, After 30 Years, Supreme Court History Project
Turns
a
Final
Page,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
30,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/washington/30scotus.html

[https://perma.cc/Z2NB-MAJZ]

(noting that "Mr. Dallas did not always get it exactly right" and that "he was sometimes flat-out
wrong").

57.

Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IOWA L. REV.

1159, 1184 n.151 (2004) (citing ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE
UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 110 (1990)); accord John P. Kelsh, The Opinion

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

870

[Vol. 21:4:857

In 1817, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to appoint an
official reporter of the Court's decisions.5 8 In 1834, the Court issued an
order requiring its opinions be delivered to the reporter, and the
reporter would then return the opinions for filing with the clerk of the
Court after publication. 59 Today, all Supreme Court opinions are issued
in written form, but the Court continues its practice of orally
60
announcing opinions from the bench on the day of issuance.
The historical record suggests that written opinions quickly
6 1 In 1784, the Connecticut
became the norm in the US judicial system.
legislature passed the first law in the United States requiring that all
62
judges must "reduce to Writing" the reasons for their judgments.
Other states followed suit, enacting similar "written opinion"
Eventually, and as noted below, many states
requirements. 63
incorporated "written opinion" requirements into their written
constitutions. 64 Thus, "written opinions became the accepted practice
65 Even so, it was
within the first decades of the Nineteenth Century."
66
still acceptable in many courts to issue decisions without any opinion.
Indeed, as Professor Crouch notes, "no-opinion judgments have also
67
remained popular throughout the nation's history."

Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 140, 142
(1999).
See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 16, 3 Stat. 376 (1817) (providing for a Supreme Court
58.
Reporter).
See Mark R. Kravitz, Written and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A
59.
DistrictJudge's Perspective on Their History, Function, and Future, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
247, 250 (2009) (citing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-

&

1835, at 389 (1988)).
See SUP. CT. R. 41.
60.
See Ehrenberg, supra note 57, at 1184 ("Almost from the beginning, the written
61.
opinion has been a prominent feature of appellate review in the United States.").
Kravitz, supra note 59, at 249 (citing Acts & Laws of Conn. § 41, at 129 (Hudson
62.
Goodwin 1796)); accordPOPKIN, supra note 54, at 183-87.
Kravitz, supra note 59, at 249; see also Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859).
63.
Such efforts were not always met with approval by the judiciary. In Williams, Justice Stephen
Field famously held as invalid an 1854 statute requiring courts to write opinions with reasons as
"a most palpable encroachment upon the independence of [the judicial] department" and was
therefore unconstitutional. Williams, 13 Cal. at 25. A substantially similar requirement was
eventually incorporated into the California state constitution, thereby legislatively overruling the
Williams decision. See People v. Kelly, 146 P.3d 547, 550-51 (Cal. 2006).
See sources cited infra note 117 and accompanying text.
64.
65.

ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 42 (1990); see also

Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1225 (2007)
("American judges at the close of the eighteenth century were already beginning to draft their
opinions in writing .... 1").
See, e.g., Philip Marcus, Affirmance Without Opinion, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 212, 214
66.
n.10 (1937) (reporting that, in 1934, the Court of Appeals of New York decided 195 cases with
opinion and 455 cases without an opinion).
Crouch, supra note 1, at 566.
67.
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In the 1960s, judicial practice entered a period of significant
change.
Facing increasing caseloads, many courts responded by
modifying the way they processed and disposed of appeals. For
instance, "the federal Courts of Appeal began adopting procedures for
disposing of cases without oral argument around the middle of the
twentieth century." 68 In addition, federal courts started disposing of a
larger percentage of appeals without an opinion, implementing
screening mechanisms and pre-appeal conferences, and permitting
unpublished opinions. 69
One specific change was the Fifth Circuit's Local Rule 21, which
was a local implementation of FRAP 36. Local Rule 21 was part of the
Fifth Circuit's broader implementation of a pre-argument screening
program intended to address the growing caseload problem. 70 At the
time, Fifth Circuit Local Rule 21 read:
Rule 21. Affirmance without opinion. When the court determines that any one or
more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted
to the court for decision: (1) that a judgment of the district court is based on findings
of fact which are not clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence in support of a jury
verdict is not insufficient; (3) that the order of an administrative agency is supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and the Court also determines that
no error of law appears and an opinion would have no precedential value, the
judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion. 7 1

On its face, Fifth Circuit Rule 21 is functionally equivalent to
the Federal Circuit's current Rule 36. Much of the wording is nearly
identical, and it specifies the circumstances under which the court could
dispose of an appeal without providing a written opinion.
Daniel Meador described the Fifth Circuit's rule as a "pioneering
step" and that "apostles were eager to spread this gospel of the new

68.
Ehrenberg, supra note 57, at 1183-84 (citing ROBERT J. MEADOR, APPELLATE JUSTICE
IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 734 (1990)); accord JOE CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: A DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES IN THE

COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (1987).
69.
See, e.g., DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS:
PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 1 (1985) ("In the search for more

efficient ways to dispose of the expanding appellate caseload, the U.S. courts of appeals have, over
the past decade, adopted a variety of procedural innovations designed to reduce the time judges
spend on many cases.").
70.
See Griffin B. Bell, Toward a More Efficient Federal Appeals System, 54 JUDICATURE
237, 243-44 (1971); Charles R. Haworth, Screeningand Summary Proceduresin the United States
Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257, 264, 274-75 (1973) ("[T]he Fifth Circuit's experience
has confirmed the time-saving potential inherent in disposing of cases without written opinions.");
Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 732, 73224 (1983); Philip Shuchman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can
Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value'?, 29 EMoRY L.J. 195, 199, 204 (1980).
71.
5TH CIR. R. 21 (affirmance without opinion currently allowed under 5TH CIR. R. 47.6).
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appellate order." 7 2 The Fifth Circuit put its Local Rule 21 to use.
According to one report by former Solicitor General Wade McCree Jr.,
"during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980, the Fifth Circuit disposed
of 1,078 cases without oral argument" and "[a]bout one-third of those
cases were disposed of in 'opinions' that said simply: 'AFFIRMED. See
Local Rule 21,' or 'ENFORCED. See Local Rule 21."'73
Since then, other federal courts of appeals implemented local
rules that are functionally equivalent to the Fifth Circuit's then-Local
Rule 21 and Federal Circuit Rule 36.74 The First, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth,
and D.C. Circuits all have current local rules expressly permitting
affirmances without opinions.7 5 In a 1990 article, then-Chief Judge
Boyce Martin of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained
the utility of the court's local rule that permitted disposition without an
opinion: "[U]nder local Rule 19 the panel can dispose of a case in open
court following oral argument if 'each judge of the panel believes that
no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion.' We
76
'Rule 19' a case by announcing our decision from the bench."
In a footnote to the cited text, Chief Judge Martin explained that
"Sixth Circuit Rule 19 supplements Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 36, which discusses entry of judgment. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 36 provides for entry of judgment in all cases,

Meador, supra note 70, at 733 (citing Winslow Christian, Using PrehearingProcedures
72.
to Increase Productivity, 52 F.R.D. 55, 55-57 (1971)); accord Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 409
F.2d 804, 805 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting "the need for exercising judicial inventiveness to increase
productivity and expedite disposition"); Huth v. S. Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526, 527 (5th Cir. 1969)
(discussing the prescreening procedures before calendaring a case). Meador's description also
referred to the summary screening period that was part of the new procedures, which included
Local Rule 21, implemented by the Fifth Circuit to address the increasing number of appeals. See
Meador, supra note 70, at 732, 735.
Wade H. McCree, Jr., BureaucraticJustice:An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777,
73.
790 (1981).
See David F. Johnson, "You Can't Handle the Truth!"-Appellate Courts'Authority to
74.
Dispose of Cases Without Written Opinions, 22 APP. ADvOC. 419, 419-20 (2010) (briefly
summarizing federal and state appellate courts that expressly permit affirmance without opinion).
1ST CIR. R. 36.0(a) ("The volume of filings is such that the court cannot dispose of each
75.
case by opinion. Rather it makes a choice, reasonably accommodated to the particular case,
whether to use an order, memorandum and order, or opinion."); 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(2)(A) ("As
members of a panel prepare for argument, they shall give thought to the appropriate mode of
disposition (order, memorandum and order, unpublished opinion, published opinion)."); 6th CIR.
R. 36 ('The court may announce its decision in open court when the decision is unanimous and
each judge of the panel believes that a written opinion would serve no jurisprudential purpose.");
9th CIR. R. 36-1 ("Each written disposition of a matter before this Court shall bear under the
number in the caption the designation OPINION, or MEMORANDUM, or ORDER."); 10th CIR. R.
36.1 ("The court does not write opinions in every case. The court may dispose of an appeal or
petition without written opinion."); D.C. CIR. R. 36.
Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 186
76.
(1999).
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including those where 'a judgment is rendered without an opinion."'7 7
Thus, the Sixth Circuit, like other circuits, held the uncompromising
view that courts were not required to write an opinion in every case.7 8
Over the years, courts of appeals have disposed of many cases
with single-word, Rule 36-type dispositions. One article summarized:
Although some Courts of Appeal, such as the Eleventh Circuit, have embraced the
use of no-comment decisions, others, such as the D.C. and Seventh Circuits, have
tried to keep one-word affirmations to a minimum. In 1998, the D.C. Circuit issued
only a single one-word affirmation, and the Seventh Circuit issued only thirty-seven
(compared to the Eleventh Circuit, which issued 502). And the Third Circuit, which
once used summary orders as a case management tool, made a conscious decision to
reverse that strategy. After issuing 404 no-comment decisions in 1998, the Circuit
pledged to "virtually eliminate" such decisions as a means of case management
because it "owed the bar more." In the first four months of 1999, the Third Circuit
issued only fifteen judgment orders without opinion, down 95% from the 280 in the
same period in 1998. The majority of the Third Circuit's no-comment opinions have
been replaced with unpublished per curiam and memorandum opinions, which
79
briefly explain the court's rationale.

Per an American Bar Association Journal article, the federal
courts of appeals in 1998 disposed of 25,020 appeals on the merits.8 0 Of
those, "[a]bout 6 percent of the total were disposed of 'without comment,'
meaning the court did not expound the law as applied in the case, or did
not explain the reasons for the ruling."8 1

Interestingly, in 1998, 113

appeals were disposed of by an oral ruling from the bench-all in the
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.8 2 The Sixth Circuit also
has expressly permitted the disposition of appeals from the bench
without an opinion. 83
With the adoption of the local rules, as well as the increasing
caseload of federal appeals courts, it was only a matter of time before
the Supreme Court was asked to weigh in on the issue. And it did by
concluding that summary affirmances and decisions without written
opinions are permissible and within the "wide latitude" courts of

77.
Id. at 186 n.38 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 36).
78.
See Stephen Louis A. Dillard, Open Chambers:Demystifying the Inner Workings and
Culture of the GeorgiaCourt ofAppeals, 65 MERCER L. REV. 831, 851-52 (2014) ("[T]he unfortunate
reality is that Rule 36 is a crucial time-management tool for judges in addressing the court of
appeals considerable caseload and the always-looming deadlines imposed by the two-term rule.").
79.
Ehrenberg, supra note 57, at 1184 n.155 (internal citations omitted).
80.
See William C. Smith, Big Objections to BriefDecisions, AM. BAR ASS'N J., Aug. 1999,
at 34, 36.
81.
Id.
82.
See id.; Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 317 n.62 (1986) (noting that the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided 34 percent of its cases by oral disposition in 1977).
83.
See 6th CrR. R. 36.
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appeals have in choosing "whether or how to write opinions."8 In
Taylor v. McKeithen, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a Fifth
Circuit appeal in which the appeals court had issued a summary
reversal without opinion.8 5 The Supreme Court's disapproval was
limited to the Fifth Circuit's reversing a trial court's decision without
an explanation. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded "[b]ecause
this record does not fully inform us of the precise nature of the litigation
and because we have not had the benefit of the insight of the Court of
Appeals."

86

In doing so, the Supreme Court expressly accepted the propriety
of the Fifth Circuit's Local Rule 21, which is essentially equivalent to
the Federal Circuit's Rule 36. Specifically, the Court stated:
We, of course, agree that the courts of appeals should have wide latitude in their
decisions of whether or how to write opinions. That is especially true with respect to
summary affirmances. See Rule 21, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. But here
the lower court summarily reversed without any opinion on a point that had been
considered at length by the District Judge. Under the special circumstances of this
case, we are loath to impute to the Court of Appeals reasoning that would raise a
substantial federal question when it is plausible that its actual ground of decision
87
was of more limited importance.

Since Taylor, several courts of appeals have expressly rejected
88
challenges to the disposition of appeals without an opinion. The US
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, following Taylor, rejected one
such challenge and noted that, "[n]ot surprisingly, given its adoption of
FRAP 36, the Supreme Court has seen no legal impediment to an
89
appellate court's decision of an appeal without opinion."
Another notable yet often overlooked point in the current debate
about Rule 36 decisions is the Supreme Court's repeated denial of cert
petitions challenging Rule 36 affirmances. A denial of a writ of
Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (per curiam); see also Conn. Bd. of
84.
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 472 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Judges often decide
difficult and important cases without explaining their reasons, and I would not suggest that they
thereby commit constitutional error.").
See Taylor, 407 U.S. at 193-94.
85.
Id. at 194.
86.
Id. at 194 n.4 (emphasis added); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482 n.6 (1972)
87.
(reviewing and affirming the summary affirmance of the Seventh Circuit without comment on its
summary nature).
See, e.g., King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522, 526 (10th Cir. 1995); Furman v. United
88.
States, 720 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir. 1983) ("There is no requirement in law that a federal appellate
court's decision be accompanied by a written opinion."); United States v. Baynes, 548 F.2d 481,
483 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting petitioner's challenge to a judgment order filed pursuant to Rule 36
and noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has approved the practice of using judgment orders with
this language in Taylor"); see also Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing
Furman approvingly and rejecting a challenge to a decision of Court of Appeals for Veterans
claims).
Furman, 720 F.2d at 264.
89.
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certiorari may not speak to the merits of the issue presented, but in this
instance, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined, in so many
instances over so many years, to revisit its decision in Taylor. One wellrespected legal commentator has identified over a dozen petitions
raising the identical issue or a very similar issue.9 0 And petitions
raising the very same issue continue to be raised. 91 The Supreme
Court's refusal to revisit Taylor is consistent with the general
understanding that appellate courts have no duty to write an opinion
when affirming, absent a direct statutory requirement. 92
The Court's lack of concern with Rule 36 affirmances may be
reflected in the Court's use of its own version of a Rule 36 decisionnamely the Court's "summary affirmance." 93 In this context, the
Supreme Court's "summary affirmance" is, in effect, a "Rule 36-type
affirmance." The Court issues a one-line statement, such as "the
90.
Hal Wegner, Chet's Shoes; Ex parte Chan: Rule 36/Per Curiam Affirmance Practice,
http://staticl.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/343607/16743345/1329929104303/ChetsShoesPerCuriamPra
ctice.pdftoken-xkq46bwNKGMsJOWJJx70wOEaCCc%3D
[https://perma.cc/344U-BZAU] (last
visited Mar. 25, 2019) (identifying the following denied petitions as raising similar questions:
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, In re Bucknam, 502 U.S. 1060 (1992) (No. 91-909); Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at i, Astronics Corp. v. Patecell, 506 U.S. 967 (1992) (No. 92-396); Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at i, Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., 513 U.S. 876 (1994) (No. 94-222); Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at i, U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 517 U.S. 1164 (1996) (No. 94-2081);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Pirkle v. Ogontz Controls Co., 516 U.S. 863 (1995) (No. 95-45);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Schoonover v. Wild Injun Prods., 516 U.S. 960 (1995) (No. 95410); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Donaldson Co. v. Nelson Indus., Inc., 516 U.S. 1072 (1996)
(No. 95-734); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bowen v. Bd. of Patent Appeals & Interferences,
530 U.S. 1263 (2000) (No. 99-1793); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Laberge v. Dep't of the
Navy, 541 U.S. 935 (2004) (No. 03-739); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bivings v. Dep't of
Army, 541 U.S. 935 (2004) (No. 03-738); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, DePalma v. Nike,
Inc., 549 U.S. 811 (2006) (No. 05-1360); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Hancock v. Dep't of
Interior, 549 U.S. 885 (2006) (No. 06-93); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, City of Gettysburg,
S.D. v. United States, 549 U.S. 955 (2006) (No. 06-235); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tehrani
v. Polar Electro, 556 U.S. 1236 (2009) (No. 08-1116); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, WayneDalton Corp. v. Amarr Co., 558 U.S. 991 (2009) (No. 09-260); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i-ii,
Romala Stone, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 562 U.S. 1201 (2011) (No. 10-777); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 12, White v. Hitachi, Ltd., 565 U.S. 825 (2011) (No. 10-1504); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, Max Rack, Inc. v. Hoist Fitness Sys., Inc., 564 U.S. 1057 (2011) (No. 10-1384)).
91.
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Sec. People, Inc. v. Ojmar US, LLC, 138
S. Ct. 2681 (2018) (No. 17-1443); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Stambler v. Mastercard Int'l
Inc., 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018) (No. 17-1140); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, In re Celgard, LLC, 138
S. Ct. 1714 (2018) (No. 16-1526); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Concaten, Inc., v. AmeriTrak
Fleet Sols., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1604 (2017) (No. 16-1109); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Shore v.
Lee, 137 S. Ct. 2197 (2017) (No. 16-1240); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 126 S. Ct. 1723 (2016)
(No. 16-1109); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Clear with Computs.,
LLC, 571 U.S. 1010 (2013) (No. 13-296).
92.
See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons:A Comparative
Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 527 n.254 (2015) ("Historically, there has never been
an affirmative reason-giving requirement bearing on the federal courts.").
93.
See, e.g., Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 565 U.S. 1104, 1104 (2012); see also cases
cited infra note 95. Note that the Supreme Court's "summary affirmance" is functionally different
than the appeals court's "summary affirmance" discussed above. See supra notes 31-33 and
accompanying text.
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judgment is affirmed." 94 The Court has explained the limits of such a
disposition:
We have often recognized that the precedential effect of a summary affirmance
extends no further than "the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by
those actions." A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below,
and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that
judgment.95

Thus, the Supreme Court itself apparently believes that it has the
power and authority to affirm lower court opinions without writing an
opinion. There is little reason to think that the Court would think
differently about an appeals court's ability to do the same. The Court's
continued declinations of petitions challenging Rule 36 dispositions
strongly suggests that the Court is unlikely to grant any future
petitions on this issue.
2. Published Versus Unpublished Opinions
Another mechanism the courts devised for dealing with their
growing caseloads was adopting what might be considered a middle
road between one-word affirmances and fully drafted precedential
opinions. In the 1960s, the federal courts of appeal started the era of
"unpublished" or "non-precedential" opinions as a means of disposing of
appeals. 96 In 1964, the Judicial Conference of the United States
See, e.g., Bluman, 565 U.S. at 1104 ("Judgment affirmed.").
94.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n.5 (1983) (citing Ill. State Bd. of Elections
95.
v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979); Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176
(1977); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
See, e.g., Keith H. Beyler, Selective PublicationRules: An Empirical Study, 21 LOY. U.
96.
CHI. L.J. 1, 1 (1989) ('The great majority of this country's intermediate appellate courts have
selective publication rules that limit the publication and use of their decisions."); Danny J. Boggs
& Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 17, 19 (2000)
('The practical need to dispose of a certain percentage of cases on an expedited basis, as a simple
docket management matter, flows from the stark reality of a relatively small federal appellate
bench and an ever-increasing caseload."); Meador, supra note 70, at 732-34; Hon. Philip Nichols,
Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 913 n.13 (1986)
(noting the increased publishing rate of opinions during his time on the bench and that "[t]his was
when the Judicial Conference selective publication plans had been several years in effect. Without
them, one can only guess what the figure might have been"); Chad M. Oldfather, Writing,
Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1288-89 (2008) ("In the
eyes of at least some judges, the practical need to process cases is the only legitimate basis for
truncating or dispensing with the opinion at the appellate level."); William L. Reynolds & William
M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The
Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, An
Evaluation of Limited Publication]; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited
Publicationin the Fourthand Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 808 (1979) [hereinafter Reynolds
& Richman, Limited Publication]; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The NonPrecedentialPrecedent-LimitedPublicationand No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169-70 (1978) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, The NonPrecedential Precedent-Limited Publication]. The body of literature addressing "unpublished"
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opinions

of "general

Each circuit then implemented local plans or

rules concerning published versus unpublished opinions. 9 8 By 1994, all
federal courts and most state courts had adopted rules to permit
unpublished opinions. 99
Judges have had varying views on publication versus
nonpublication, ranging from seeing no value in publishing every
opinion, to recognizing the pragmatic tradeoffs, to asserting that there
is no reasoned basis for selective publication.1 0 0 The bar has perhaps
been more uniformly against the idea of nonpublication of appellate
opinions. 101
Prior to the internet age, nonpublication had a significant and
practical effect on limiting the accessibility of an "unpublished" opinion.
If the opinion was not published, then it would not be included in an
official report (e.g., West's Federal Reporter, 2d).
Because the
"unpublished" opinion was not in the official reporter, other litigants
and their attorneys would likely be unaware of the opinion, at least
prior to the FederalAppendix reporter. The unpublished opinion was
unlikely to create any "mischief' in the court's jurisprudence. An
unpublished opinion was the equivalent of a tree falling in the forest
with no one around to hear it, except the specific parties involved. 102

opinions is too vast to summarize, or to even cite, all of the leading articles. Professors William
Reynolds and William Richman authored several widely cited law review articles in the 1970s and
1980s that explored the various issues associated with the nonpublication of appellate opinions.
In addition to the academic literature, the Federal Judicial Center has published several reports
of nonpublication of opinions. See, e.g., ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
CITING UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN FEDERAL APPEALS 5 (2005); STIENSTRA, supra note 69, at 2.
97.
WARREN OLNEY II, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 16-17, 1964, at 11
(1964); accord THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 127 (1994); REAGAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 1-4 (describing developments in

nonpublication); STIENSTRA, supra note 69, at 5-14 (describing the history of the debate about
nonpublication).
98.
See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra note 96, at 808.
99.
See Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial
Opinions:A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 125 (1994).
100.
Compare Nichols, supra note 96, at 916 ("The true reason behind the selective
publication policy is that it is wrong to ask publishers to publish, libraries to collect, and scholars
to read opinions that merely labor the obvious."), with RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:

CRISIS AND REFORM 122-25 (1985) (explaining that selective publication of opinions reflects the
decision "between preparing but not publishing opinions in many cases and preparing no opinions
in those cases," which is like "giving the parties reasons for the decision ... and not giving them
reasons even though the appeal is not frivolous").
101.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
102.
See The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court ofAppeals for
the Federal Circuit, supra note 16, at 419 (statement of former Chief Justice Howard T. Markey)
("An unpublished opinion should be, to everybody but the parties, incomprehensible and useless.
It's certainly useless as precedent.").
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This changed, however, with the advent of electronic databases.
Legal research service providers, such as LexisNexis and Westlaw,
began including unpublished opinions in their databases at least since
the mid-1990s. In 2001, Westlaw published the Federal Appendix,
which was the "official" hardcopy version of the collection of
The Federal Appendix eviscerated any
unpublished opinions. 103
distinction between "published" and "unpublished" opinions. Indeed,
then-Judge Samuel Alito explained in 2002 that unpublished opinions
104
are, for all intents and purposes, published.
Courts wrote unpublished, or non-precedential, opinions so the
parties would gain at least some insight into the reasoning of the court.
At the same time, though, many cases were straightforward decisionsat least in the judges' view-and did not warrant the significant
expenditure of time necessary to write a "published" or precedential
opinion. In response, most courts implemented rules barring the
05
citation of non-precedential opinions.
The rules barring citation of non-precedential opinions were
greeted with substantial criticism. Litigants initiated legal challenges
07
to the rules.106 The federal judiciary studied the impact of the rules.1
Many law journal articles discussed the advantages and disadvantages
of unpublished opinions and the rules barring citation of those
opinions. 0 8 Eventually, the FRAP were amended so that the courts of
appeal were not permitted to bar the citation of non-precedential
opinions issued after January 1, 2007.
This brief survey highlights the evolution of the practices of the
appellate courts. Just over seventy years ago, the general norm was
that appeals usually ended with a written opinion-but not necessarily
a detailed account of the reasoning. Oral decisions from the bench were
also prevalent. As caseloads increased, the courts' practices changed
103.

See REAGAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 23.

See Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
104.
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 5 (2002) [hereinafter
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts] (statement of Judge Alito) (explaining that the term
"unpublished opinion" is "somewhat misleading" and that essentially all opinions "are published
in any sense of the word").
See REAGAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 2-4; David R. Cleveland, Appellate Court Rules
105.
Governing Publication, Citation, and Precedential Value of Opinions:An Update, 16 J. APP. PRAC.
PROCESS 257, 257 (2015). For background, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900-01
(8th Cir. 2000); LAURAL L. HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 30-34 (2d ed. 2011); REAGAN, supra note 96; Cleveland,
supra, at 257; Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument
Against Rules ProhibitingCitation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695, 69596 (2001).
See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
106.
See HOOPER ET AL., supranote 105, at 31; REAGAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 1-4.
107.
See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 105, at 258-80; Wade, supra note 105 at 695.
108.
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and the courts introduced time-saving measures, including dispositions
without opinion, decreased availability of oral argument, prescreening
of appeals, summary disposition, and unpublished opinions. With the
advent of electronic databases, unpublished opinions were unpublished
in name only, and such decisions, which can now be cited back to the
court (or lower tribunals), create minefields in the court's
jurisprudence.
A large percentage of cases are issued as
nonprecedential or unpublished decisions.1 09 They are just as readily
available as precedential opinions. And, of course, courts have Rule 36
affirmances. Given the evolution of unpublished opinions, Rule 36
affirmances are, in one respect, akin to unpublished opinions of years
past because, in the past, the general bar would remain unaware of the
reasoning for an unpublished decision.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DOES NOT HAVE TO WRITE AN OPINION
WITH REASONS IN EVERY APPEAL FROM USPTO

With that historical background and an overview of the
applicable rules, this Article now turns to the specific legal question: Do
§ 144 and § 1071(a)(4) forbid the use of Rule 36 affirmances in USPTO
appeals? Based on the statutory text, the historical context, the
legislative history and purpose behind the amendments, and the
governing rules of appellate procedure-as well as the deference
traditionally granted to the judiciary-the only reasonable conclusion
is that those statutory provisions do not prohibit the Federal Circuit
from utilizing Rule 36 affirmances to dispose of appeals from the
USPTO.
Instead, the amendments were technical amendments
instructing the court to transmit the court's mandate and written
opinion to the USPTO.
A. The Statutory Text Does Not Require the Federal Circuit to Write an
Opinion-Only to Transmit an Opinion if Written
To start, the full text of § 144 reads as follows:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the decision
from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office.
Upon its determination the court shall issue to the Director its mandate and opinion,
which shall be entered of record in the Patent and Trademark Office and shall govern
the further proceedings in the case. 1 1 0

109.
110.
focuses its
§ 1071(a)(4)

See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 105, at 30.
35 U.S.C. § 144 (2018) (emphasis added). For purposes of simplicity, the analysis here
discussion on § 144 but applies equally to the trademark provision, 15 U.S.C.
(2018). See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (employing language identical to 35 U.S.C. § 144).
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In interpreting the statute, three phrases are dispositive in reaching
the correct interpretation. First, what does "issue to the Director"
mean? Does it mean that the court must affirmatively write an opinion,
with reasons, or does it mean that the court must "transmit" to the
USPTO Director the court's mandate and written opinion, if any?
Second, what does "its mandate and opinion" mean, versus "a
mandate and opinion?" In other words, by using "its," did Congress
recognize that, under the then-existing rules, the Federal Circuit was
already required to issue a mandate under FRAP 41 and also had a local
rule specifying that appeals would be disposed of by written opinion?
Third, what does the word "opinion" mean? Does it include a
Rule 36 affirmance? If so, then a Rule 36 affirmance satisfies the court's
obligation even under the erroneous argument that § 144 requires a
written opinion in every appeal from the USPTO.
The statute lends itself to at least three conceivable
interpretations. First, the statute could require the court to write an
opinion with reasons and bases in every appeal from the USPTO, as
Crouch and others argue.1 1 1 Second, the statute could be using a
broader definition of the term "opinion"-so broad that a Rule 36
affirmance constitutes an opinion for purposes of the statute. Third,
the statute can be understood as a command to the court to transmit to
the agency (i.e., "to the Director") the court's mandate and opinion-if
written-but the statute does not expressly require the court to write
an opinion in every USPTO appeal. This Section examines each of
these. First, this Section examines and contrasts the "transmittal"
interpretation and "mandatory written opinion with reasons"
interpretation.1 1 2 Next, it explores the interpretation that a Rule 36
order constitutes an opinion for the purposes of the statute.
1. "Transmittal" Versus "Mandatory Written Opinion"
The first interpretation, which this Article refers to as the
"transmittal" interpretation, reads the statute as a command to the
Federal Circuit to transmit its mandate and its opinion, if any, to the
USPTO Director upon the court's final determination in the appeal.

See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 1, at 562.
111.
The Author calls this interpretation the "mandatory written opinion theory," but one
112.
interesting twist should be noted. Even if one were to accept the thesis that the statutes preclude
Rule 36 affirmances in USPTO appeals, that thesis still does not require a written opinion. The
statute says nothing about "written." Perhaps the court could issue an oral opinion from the bench,
with the recording (or transcription thereof) being sent to the USPTO Director and therefore
complying with the "issued to the Director" requirement. Would we want the court to issue
decisions from the bench right after oral argument? The Author explores this further possibility
later in this Article. See infra Section I.C.1.
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This is an instruction to the court of what it must do once it decides the
case. The interpretation recognizes that the text itself does not
expressly address whether a written opinion must be prepared by the
court in every case.
In contrast, the second interpretation is the "mandatory written
opinion" interpretation. This interpretation views the statute as a
command to the Federal Circuit that every USPTO appeal must
conclude with a written opinion that provides some reasoning for the
court's ultimate decision. If the prepositional phrase in the relevant
language is dropped, the text reads "the court shall issue .

.

. its

mandate and opinion." 113 Read this way, the language appears to
command the Federal Circuit to issue an opinion in all appeals from the
USPTO.
First, from a purely textual perspective, the statute does not
expressly command or direct the Federal Circuit to actually write an
opinion. The statute uses the verb "issue." The word "issue" means to
"[s]upply or distribute (something)."114 It does not instruct the court to
write or produce anything. Accordingly, on its face, the statute is an
instruction to send the mandate and opinion to the USPTO-assuming
those two documents exist.
True, the command to "issue" a mandate and opinion may
inferentially lead one to conclude that an opinion must be written for it
to be issued. One could interpret the term "issue" to include, in its
operational meaning, the act of creating or writing. Thus, perhaps one
interpretation of "issue" is that the court must "write and send" the
mandate and opinion to the USPTO. Alternatively, the word "issue"
can be interpreted merely as sending, and it implies a predicate act of
writing the opinion. Then, the predicate act of writing the opinion must
be inferred to be mandatory. But this interpretation is at best an
inferential conclusion. The text does not directly command the court to
write an opinion. 115
Professor Crouch acknowledges the possibility of the
interpretation this Article calls the "transmittal" interpretation. He
writes that "a conceivable interpretation of the statute would require
issuance of the opinion only if such an opinion exists-rendering the
requirement merely an illusory request."1 16 This Article argues that the
text is neither a requirement to write an opinion nor an illusory request.
113.

35 U.S.C. § 144.

114.

Issue, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/

issue [https://perma.cc/9D4Z-XJJ2] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
115.
35 U.S.C. § 144. As explained below, FRAP 41 controls the issuance of the court's
mandate. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
116.
Crouch, supra note 1, at 576.
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Rather, the text of the statute instructs the court what to do once it has
decided the case and, in part, if it has written an opinion-not on the
issue of whether the court must write an opinion.
Had Congress intended to require the Federal Circuit to write
opinions in all appeals from the USPTO, it could have used direct
language instructing the court to do so. For example, Congress could
have written that "the court shall write an opinion and issue the
mandate and opinion to the Director."
Congress could have also employed language employed by
several states in their constitutions and laws instructing state courts to
Several states have
produce written opinions with reasons.
the opinions of those
requiring
constitutional mandates to their courts
117
For instance, under the California
courts be issued in writing.
constitution, the California Supreme Court and appellate courts must
8
make decisions "in writing with reasons stated."i The inclusion of the
language "with reasons stated" is important because the phrase
specifically requires the California courts to provide an opinion that is
more than simply a Rule 36-type affirmance. In these instances, the
states have made the policy choice imposing a "written opinion with
reasons" requirement on their courts, but that same policy choice is not
evident from the language of § 144 and § 2701(a)(4).
Had Congress wanted to impose a mandatory written opinion
requirement, it was aware of language that would have spoken more
directly to the issue of a written opinion. 1 9 When Congress created the
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("The decisions of the court shall be in writing and
117.
the grounds stated."); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 ("Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of
appeal . . . shall be in writing with reasons stated."); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 15 (Supreme Court
determinations must be in "an opinion, in writing"); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 6 ("Decisions of the
supreme court . .. shall be in writing and shall contain a concise statement of the facts and reasons
for each decision and reasons for each denial of leave to appeal."); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(C) ("The
decisions in all cases in the Supreme Court shall be reported, together with the reasons therefor.");
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("In the determination of causes all decisions of the [supreme] court
shall be given in writing and the grounds of the decision shall be stated."); W. VA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 4 ("[E]very point fairly arising upon the record shall be considered and decided; the reasons
therefor shall be concisely stated in writing and preserved with the record . . . .").
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14; see also Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions,
118.
18 CAL. L. REV. 486, 486 (1930).
For the present discussion, the Author accepts that the 1893 and 1929 acts require an
119.
opinion that is more than a Rule 36-type affirmance. It is not entirely clear, however, whether the
statute requires the court to write an opinion with its reasons, as opposed to merely requiring the
court to reduce its judgment to writing instead of issuing a ruling from the bench, if it chose to
provide reasons for the decision. Further, the requirement in the 1893 Act that "the opinion of the
said court of appeals in every case shall be rendered in writing" was a general requirement for the
new court and not specific for patent cases. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 10, 27 Stat. 434, 436
(1893). Specifically, section 9 of the Act established jurisdiction for appealing from the Patent
Commissioner. § 9, 27 Stat. at 436. In contrast, the requirement for written opinions was set forth
in section 10: "That the opinion of the said court of appeals in every case shall be rendered in
writing, and shall be filed in such case as a part of the record thereof." § 10, 27 Stat. at 436.
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CCPA from the old US Court of Customs Appeals in 1929, it transferred
jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent Office to the new CCPA. 120 In
the legislation, Congress instructed the following:
The opinion of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in every case on appeal
from decision of the Patent Office shall be rendered in writing, and shall be filed in
such case as part of the record thereof, and a certified copy of said opinion shall be
sent to the Commissioner of Patents and shall be entered of record in the Patent
Office. 121

Even earlier in 1893, Congress similarly created the (former)
D.C. Circuit-which, under the same legislation, was granted
jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent Office; Congress directly
instructed that "the opinion of the said court of appeals in every case
shall be rendered in writing, and shall be filed in such case as a part of
the record thereof." 122 Thus, there was clear federal legislative
precedent for statutory language requiring a court to render its opinion
in writing.
In 1984, if Congress wanted to impose (or re-impose) a
requirement that the Federal Circuit could not use Rule 36 affirmances
for USPTO appeals, it could have at least used the language it used for
the CCPA prior to 1952.123 The clear textual differences between § 144
and the 1893 and 1929 statutes are enough to demonstrate that the
plain text of § 144 does not require the Federal Circuit to write an
opinion with reasoning in every USPTO appeal. 124
In addition, the use of the term "its" in the phrase "its mandate
and opinion" in § 144 further indicates that the amendment did not add
any requirement of creating a mandate and an opinion in every USPTO
appeal. In fact, the use of "its" almost certainly reflects the fact that, at
the time, the Federal Circuit produced both an opinion and a mandate
in every appeal. There was no need for Congress to impose any such
requirement.125
Specifically, in the Federal Circuit's first set of local rules,
Federal Circuit Rule 18(a) stated, in part, that the "[d]isposition of
appeals shall be with a published opinion or an unpublished opinion." 126
This rule remained in place until July 15, 1985, when the court
amended it to read, "Disposition of appeals may be announced in a

120.
Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, §§ 1-2, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475-76 (1929).
121.
§ 3, 45 Stat. at 1476.
122.
§ 10, 27 Stat. at 436.
123.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 3, 45 Stat. 1475 (1929).
124.
See 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2018); Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 10, 27 Stat. 436 (1893); Act of
Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 3, 45 Stat. 1475 (1929).
125.
See 35 U.S.C. § 144.
126.
FED. CIR. R. 18(a) (Feb. 1, 1984).
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published or unpublished opinion or order." 127 Thus, from 1984 to 1986,
the court had decided, as a question of court-specific policy, to provide
an opinion, either published or unpublished, in every appeal.
Similarly, the court has long been required to prepare a mandate
in every appeal. FRAP 41 requires a court to issue its mandate within
a specified timeframe.1 28 The mandate establishes what the lower
tribunal can consider on remand.1 29 FRAP 41's requirement to issue a
mandate was already in effect at the time Congress passed the
amendment to § 144 in 1984. Congress therefore had no reason to
command the Federal Circuit to produce its mandate, as FRAP 41
already controlled. The "mandatory written opinion" view of § 144
therefore leads to an incorrect construction that would render some of
the statute's language superfluous to the preexisting FRAP 41.130
When § 144 is understood as a transmittal directive, the
inclusion of the "its mandate and opinion" requirement is
understandable. The statute simply instructs the court to send the
mandate and opinion to the agency. When this amendment was
enacted, Congress and the court understood that both a mandate and
an opinion were prepared for every appeal, and there was no need to
enact a superfluous amendment.
The transmittal interpretation § 144 disposes of the argument
that "[i]t would be absurd to interpret this provision as requiring
neither a mandate nor an opinion because without either, the case is
never decided."l 31 The transmittal interpretation does not lead to such
an "absurd" view because FRAP 41 already requires the court to issue
a mandate. Section 144 does not need to be interpreted as directing the
court to prepare a mandate because that directive pre-existed in FRAP
Interestingly, if one accepts the mandatory written opinion
41.
interpretation of § 144, the logical extension is that the Federal Circuit
had no obligation to prepare a mandate. That conclusion is incorrect.

See id.; FED. CIR. R. 18(a) (July 15, 1985). Of course, the Federal Circuit was within
127.
its authority to later change the old Rule 18(a) and enact a new local rule permitting decisions
without opinions, pursuant to FRAP 36. See FED. R. APP. P. 36.
See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b) ("When Issued. The court's mandate must issue 7 days after
128.
the time to file a petition for rehearing expires, or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely
petition for panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate,
whichever is later.").
See Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S. 488, 492 (1838); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St.
129.
Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) ("A statute should be construed so that
130.
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant. . . .") (quoting 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 46.06

(rev.

6th ed. 2000)); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (describing the anti-superfluous
canon as "one of the most basic interpretive canons").
Crouch, supra note 1, at 578.
131.
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The important point is that, when the amendment to § 144 was
proposed, the Federal Circuit had decided, as court policy, to issue
opinions in all of its appeals, per Federal Circuit Rule 18(a). 132 The
court also always issued mandates for all appeals per FRAP 41. This
explains why the statutory amendment refers to "its mandate and
opinion." 133 Congress understood that the court's practice was to
provide a mandate and opinion in every case.
Other points warrant a response in the context of the statute's
text. The amendments to § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) were proposed in the
shadow of FRAP 36-which expressly authorized courts, including the
Federal Circuit-to decide appeals without an opinion.
Any
interpretation of the statutory text must be made with the
understanding that, since 1967, Congress had expressly authorized all
courts of appeals to dispose of appeals without writing an opinion.
Having been promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act and
being a procedural rule, FRAP 36 has the force of law, just as any other
federal statute.
To accept the "mandatory written opinion"
interpretation would require the conclusion that Congress impliedly
repealed the availability of FRAP 36 for the Federal Circuit in patent
and trademark appeals from the USPTO. Thus, one must apply the
"implied repeal" doctrine when construing § 144 and § 1071(a)(4).1 3 4
But implied repeal arguments are rarely favored when
construing statutes. 135 As the Supreme Court explained in United
States v. Borden Co., "[i]t is a cardinal principle of construction that
repeals by implication are not favored. When there are two acts upon
the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible." 13 6

132.
FED. CIR. R. 18(a) (July 15, 1985).
133.
35 U.S.C. § 144 (2018).
134.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987); Wood v. United States,
41 U.S. 342, 362-63 (1842).
135.
See, e.g., United States v. Madigan, 300 U.S. 500, 506 (1937) ("[T]he modification by
implication of the settled construction of an earlier and different section is not favored."); Samuels
v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 194 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[R]epeals [by implication] are
strongly disfavored on the ground that Congress is normally expected to be aware of its previous
enactments and to provide a clear statement of repeal if it intends to extinguish an extant
remedy."); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 673 F.2d 507, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[A]n argument of implied
repeal [is] an argument that rarely succeeds. .. ."); ANTONIN ScALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 331 (2012) ("A clear, authoritative judicial holding on

the meaning of a particular provision should not be cast in doubt and subjected to challenge
whenever a related though not utterly inconsistent provision is adopted in the same statute or
even in an affiliated statute.").
136.
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
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Generally, implied repeal occurs only when the two statutes are
137
irreconcilably inconsistent or "positive[ly] repugnant."
Here, § 144 and Rule 36 are not plainly repugnant because,
under the "transmittal" interpretation, § 144 does not require an
opinion with reasons to be written-only that one be transmitted to the
USPTO if written-and thus § 144 does not impliedly repeal the
availability of Rule 36 to the Federal Circuit for USPTO appeals. The
statutory text is lacking the strong evidence necessary to conclude that
Congress intended to limit the scope of FRAP 36, and limit it in a way
that was applicable only to the Federal Circuit and only in USPTO
appeals. It would have been highly unusual, fifty years after the
enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, for Congress to include an
amendment in a "technical amendments" bill that significantly limited
the scope of a previously enacted rule of appellate procedure, without
proceeding through the normal rulemaking process.
Second, proponents of the "mandatory written opinion" theory
analogize § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52.138 Rule 52 requires district judges to "find the facts specially and
state its conclusions of law separately."1 39 From a textual standpoint,
the analogy is misplaced. If anything, it reinforces the conclusion that
§ 144 and § 1071(a)(4) do not require a written opinion. Rule 52 does
not require the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law to
be written as an opinion by the court. Rather, the court's findings "may
140 The purpose
be stated on the record after the close of the evidence."
of Rule 52 perhaps supports the normative argument that an appeals
court's opinion should always be in writing with its reasoning
explained, but the present question is the positive question of what the
law requires under § 144 and § 1071(a)(4). As a further distinguishing
point, one may argue that because a party has the right to appeal a trial
court decision, there exists a much stronger need for detailed factual
findings and legal conclusions in trial court decisions. Conversely,
because only a small percentage of appellate decisions are reviewed by
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 122 (1979) ("[T]he legislative intent to
137.
repeal must be manifest in the 'positive repugnancy between the provisions."' (quoting Borden, 308
U.S. at 199)); Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1936).
Crouch, supra note 1, at 564-66.
138.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) ("In General. In an action tried on the facts without a jury
139.
or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law
separately. The findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence
or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court. Judgment must be
entered under Rule 58.").
140.

See id. at 52(a); 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 2571 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that the 1948 and 1983 amendments to Rule
52(a) make clear that findings and conclusions are not necessary when deciding most motions and
that the trial judge orally make findings and conclusions and have them recorded in open court).
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the Supreme Court, the need for a detailed opinion- particularly in the
case of an affirmance-is substantially reduced. Overall, analogizing
to Rule 52 does not lend much support to the "mandatory written
opinion" interpretation.
Another point raised in support of the mandatory opinion
interpretation is that it appears that the "appellate panels do create
and exchange informal opinions-either oral or written-of the cases
that eventually lead to the R.36 judgments." 141 That argument
misunderstands the actual deliberative process by the court.
In
general, there is no "opinion" drafted for a case decided via Rule 36. An
opinion is usually written only after the panel has voted on how to rule
on the case and decided to write an opinion, assigning one judge on the
panel as the lead author of the opinion. 142 No doubt, the panel discusses
the case at the conference immediately following oral argument, but
there can be no argument that the judges' deliberation during
conference would or should constitute an opinion for the court.
As Professor Crouch's article notes, Judge Reyna is reported to
have remarked that, "when a Rule 36 affirmance is delivered the court
has done 90% of the work needed for a written opinion." 143 Assuming it
to be an accurate report, Judge Reyna's remark likely refers to the
percentage of decision-making work performed in reaching the
decision-but not the additional drafting and reviewing time needed to
publish an opinion. The judges and their clerks spend many hours
reading the briefs and the record, conducting additional legal research,
and discussing the issues on appeal, all without writing an opinion.
Once the court has heard oral argument, 90 percent-perhaps moreof the decisional work has been done. But to write a carefully worded
opinion requires a significant amount of additional time. In the end,
however, this consideration is better left for the normative issues of
what should be the best practice of the Federal Circuit in deciding
USPTO appeals. 144

141.

Crouch, supra note 1, at 577-78.

142.

See, e.g., U.S.

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING

PROCEDURES
18
(2008),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/IOPsl22006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9E26-WTLU]; 9TH CIR. R. 8.
143.
Crouch, supranote 1, at 578 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Peter Harter
& Gene Quinn, Rule 36: UnprecedentedAbuse at the FederalCircuit,IIPWATCHDOG (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/12/rule-36-abuse-federal-circuit/id=76971/
[https://perma.cc/4WYN-FMQP].
144.
See infra Section III.A.2.
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2. The Term "Opinion" Includes "Rule 36 Affirmance"
A second conceivable interpretation of the statute focuses on the
meaning of the term "opinion." One conceivable interpretation is that
the term "opinion," as used in § 144, means simply any written
document that states the court's decision, regardless of whether the
written decision provides the court's reasoning or bases for its decision.
If the term "opinion" includes a Rule 36 affirmance, then there
obviously is no concern about the Federal Circuit's use of Rule 36
affirmances in USPTO appeals, because the plain language of the
statute would authorize them.
A purely textual approach offers some support for this
interpretation of "opinion." An opinion can be any written document
that captures the court's decision. A Rule 36 affirmance does state that
the decision is affirmed. And there is also reason to distinguish a barebones "opinion" from an "opinion with reasons or bases," as several state
constitutions have done. 145
Indeed, on occasion, Rule 36 affirmances have been referred to
as "opinions."146 In essence, this interpretation posits that the statute
is using the term "opinion" to merely refer to the document that
captures the court's decision.
That being said, this interpretation of § 144 has hurdles. As
Professor Crouch explains, the term "opinion" has a generally accepted
meaning. Indeed, the term "opinion" is understood by the Federal
Circuit itself as "[a] court's written statement explaining its decision in
a given case, . . . including the statement of facts, points of law,

rationale, and dicta." 147 The Federal Circuit has more frequently used
the term "opinion" in a manner distinguishing it from a Rule 36
affirmance. 148 The weight of persuasiveness appears to fall on the side
of the term "opinion" as including something more than a one-word
order that states "affirmed."
Of course, that conclusion only begs the question of how much is
required in order for a court's order to rise to the level of a "written
opinion." If § 144 does actually require the Federal Circuit to write an

145.

See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14; MD. CONST. art. IV, § 15;

MICH. CONST. art. VI,

§

6; OHIO CONST. art. IV,

§

2(C); WASH. CONST. art. IV,

§

2; W. VA. CONST.

art. VIII, § 4.
See Barco N.V. v. Tech. Props. Ltd., No. 5:08-cv-05398-JF/HRL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
146.
99668, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010) ("[Tlhe Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment in a Rule 36
opinion." (emphasis added) (citing Tech. Props. Ltd. v. Arm, Ltd., 276 F. App'x 1019 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (unpublished)).
Opinion, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
147.
148.

See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, supra note 142, at 19; Crouch,

supra note 1, at 573-75.
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opinion in every appeal from the USPTO, would a one-paragraph
opinion suffice? As explained below, these questions are a further
reason to reject the argument that Congress intended to micromanage
the Federal Circuit's opinion writing.
B. The Historical Context of Section 144 Does Not Support a
Mandatory Written Opinion with Reasons Requirement
In addition to the specific legislative history, it is useful to
understand the broader historical context. Courts routinely consider
the "historical context" when construing statutory text. 149 Indeed, the
Supreme Court undertook this historical context analysis in Bilski v.
Kappos, where the Court ruled on the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.150 The historical context of the statute is
particularly important because the stated purpose of the 1984
amendment was to make the procedure for USPTO appeals consistent
with other types of appeals. 15

1

The historical context adds further support to the argument that

§ 144 and § 1071(a)(4) do not impose a written opinion requirement on
the Federal Circuit. By 1984, it was long established that federal
appellate courts did in fact dispose of appeals without an opinion. 152 As
noted above, for example, the Fifth Circuit had implemented its Local
Rule 21.153
The Supreme Court approved summary affirmances
without an opinion. 154 It would have been extraordinary for Congress
to impose a novel requirement on the Federal Circuit with language
that does not expressly require the court to write an opinion.
This historical context is also consistent with the amendment to
the applicable statute in the Patent Act of 1952 (1952 Act). 155 The 1952

149.
See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 229 (2014) (rejecting petitioners'
statutory construction because it was "incompatible with the historical context surrounding" the
passage of the legislation); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013)
("Nothing about this historical context suggests that Congress also, intended federal common law
under the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct occurring in the territory of another
sovereign.").

150.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-02, 626 (2010).
151.
See infra Section III.D.
152.
See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text; Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal
Courts ofAppeals Survive until 1984?: An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial
Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 764-65 (1983) (noting that "disposing of a bigger fraction of
appeals without a published opinion" is a possible response to dealing with a "federal appellate
caseload crisis").
153.
See infra Section I.C.1.
154.
See id.
155.
Act of July 15, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 802-03 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 144 (1952)) ("The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, on petition,
shall hear and determine such appeal on the evidence produced before the Patent Office, and the
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Act eliminated the prior statutory language, which imposed a written
opinion requirement. Instead of instructing that "the opinion of the
Court .

.

. shall be rendered in writing" from 1929, the 1952 Act's

command was that "the court shall return to the Commissioner a
certificate of its proceedings and decision, which shall be entered of
record in the Patent Office and govern the further proceedings in the
case." 56

The 1952 amendment is understandable when placed into
historical context. The amendment occurred after the passage of the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934. By that point, Congress had granted, to
the Supreme Court, "the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the
district courts of the United States and for the courts of the District of
Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
15 7
When Congress
practice and procedure in civil actions at law."
revised the patent laws in 1952, Congress may have seen no need to
codify a specific requirement about court procedure. Congress had
already transferred to the judiciary the broad responsibility of selecting
and implementing rules governing judicial procedure.
The CCPA used a summary affirmance mechanism to dispose of
appeals that lacked merit. For example, in General Electric Co. v.
United States, the court's opinion consisted of two sentences: "We agree
with the decision of the Court of International Trade that the imported
electronic and amplifier packs were correctly classified in [the Tariff
Schedules of the United States], items 685.23 and 684.70, respectively.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below and adopt the trial court's
opinion as our own." 15 8 In another, the CCPA summarized the
159
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's finding with two sentences.
Then the CCPA presented the sum and substance of its analysis: "We
agree with, approve and adopt the opinion of the board, and its decision
is affirmed."1 60 While such summary affirmances were not the norm for
the CCPA, they evidence the fact that the court did not see itself to be
required to write an opinion explaining its reasoning in every appeal.
The CCPA's use of two-line affirmances conforms to its stated
understanding that it was not required to provide any detailed written

decision shall be confined to the points set forth in the reasons of appeal. Upon its determination
the court shall return to the Commissioner a certificate of its proceedings and decision, which shall
be entered of record in the Patent Office and govern the further proceedings in the case.").
Compare id., with Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 3, 45 Stat. 1475 (1929).
156.
Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
157.
§ 2072).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 681 F.2d 785, 786 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
158.
See Long John Distilleries Ltd. v. Sazerac Co., 426 F.2d 1406, 1407 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
159.
Id.
160.
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review of the Board's decision when affirming. In Hamer v. White, the
court wrote:
The decisions of the board, of course, will be available to all who may care to read it
after our decision shall have been published. Any written review of the evidence
made by us could be little more than a paraphrase of what the board said. Were we
reversing the decision of the board it would be incumbent upon us to give a written
review and point out the reasons for disagreement. Since we are affirming, no such
161
review is necessary.

The court came to a similar conclusion in Kenyon v. Platt:
It is not necessary for us to discuss all the exhibits or to quote extensively from the
testimony. The Board has gone into this matter at great length and since we are in
agreement with its conclusion that priority was properly awarded to the appellees it
would serve no useful purpose to here restate in detail the attempts shown in
appellees' voluminous record to prove reduction to practice. We will content
ourselves with calling attention to certain features of the same, following in part this
court's practice in Hamer v. White et al[.], 143 F.2d 987, 31 C.C.P.A., Patents,
1186.162

These statements by the CCPA reflect the general, historical practice
that, absent a specific statutory requirement, federal courts of appeals
had no requirement to prepare a written opinion, let alone an opinion
explaining in detail its reasoning when affirming a lower tribunal's
decision.
Another argument advanced in support of the mandatory
written opinion interpretation is that the "general principal [sic] of
federal administrative law requir[ing] written explanations of adverse
judgments" further militates against the propriety of Rule 36
affirmances.163 The argument misses the mark, however, with respect
to the issue of positive law. The analogy to agency decision-making may
be tangentially relevant to the normative question of what the court
should do, but there are significant differences between agencies and
federal appeals courts, which require an administrative agency to
explain in detail its decision but do not require a federal appeals court
to do the same. 164
The requirement for federal agencies to provide reasons for their
decisions has been addressed and explored extensively in the case law
and academic commentary.165
The Supreme Court's landmark

161.
Hamer v. White, 143 F.2d 987, 990 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
162.
Kenyon v. Platt, 152 F.2d 1006, 1008 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
163.
Crouch, supra note 1, at 566.
164.
See Cohen, supra note 92, at 528-31.
165.
See, e.g., Lisa Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1690-92 (2004); Gillian E. Metzger, OrdinaryAdministrative
Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 (2010); David Zaring,
Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2010); see also Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the
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8
166
decisions in S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. and Overton Park v. Volpel form

the bedrock of the judicial review case law. As Professor Metzger has
explained, "Part of the explanation for this expansion of substantive
judicial scrutiny of agency decision-making lies in constitutional
concerns with broad delegations of power to agencies and the attendant
risk of unaccountable and arbitrary exercises of administrative
power." 168 Furthermore, the Administrative Procedure Act establishes
169 These
a statutory requirement for an agency to explain its decision.
same concerns do not exist when the judicial decision is made by a court
of appeals. While it may be preferable for an appeals court to explain
its decision in detail every time, that is a normative argument.
Additionally, a "mandatory written opinion" requirement would
conflict with the legislative purpose of making Federal Circuit appeals
uniform. Such a requirement would be unique to only patent and
trademark appeals. The general remarks about the amendments
during the legislative process expressed a desire to make the appeals
practice uniform across the types of cases the Federal Circuit hears.
The Department of Justice viewed the amendments to § 144 and
§1071(a)(4) as "conform[ing] these sections [including § 144] to the
1 7 0 While not
usual procedure for taking appeals to the circuit courts."
definitive, the general impression is an intent to make a uniform
appeals process-not one specific to patent and trademark cases. The
"mandatory written opinion" interpretation is not consistent with the
1
general objective of the legislation.17
This transmittal requirement makes sense when placed in the
Today, with the ubiquitous flow of
proper historical context.
information and instantaneous news reporting, it is easy to forget that
society was not always so interconnected. In 1984, there was no Twitter
or Facebook to announce the latest decisions by the Federal Circuit.
Instead, hard copies of the decisions were sent to the parties. Once the

Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 181-88 (2003) (explaining
an administrative law rule that enforces the norm of decsionmaking rationality on agencies).
See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
166.
See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
167.
Metzger, supra note 165, at 491.
168.
5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2018) (requiring an agency to provide a "brief statement of the
169.
grounds for denial" when denying a petition or application); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (instructing the
reviewing court to hold unlawful agency action that it deems "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion").
Technical Amendments to the Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982: Hearing on
170.
H.R. 3824 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. ofJustice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 29 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearing].
Similarly, the "mandatory written opinion with reasons" requirement would lead to
171.
the non-uniform result of making the USPTO the only federal agency for which a reviewing court
would have to provide a written opinion with reasons. Cf. D.C. CIR. R. 36(d).
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Federal Circuit decided a USPTO appeal, the USPTO would have to be
informed of the decision by the instruction set forth in § 144 that "the
court shall issue to the Director its mandate and opinion."1 72
In short, the correct reading of § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) does not
impose a unique requirement on the Federal Circuit that it must
prepare a written opinion in every appeal from the USPTO. To read
the statute in that manner would "wrench statutory words out of their
legislative and historical context and treat legislation as no more than
a 'collection of English words' rather than 'a working instrument of
government."' 1 73
The text of § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) does not
demonstrate the congressional intent to depart from the long history of
federal courts using abbreviated means of disposing of appeals. The
statute is merely an instruction that the court's mandate, that is
necessarily prepared per FRAP 41, and the court's opinion, if written,
be transmitted to the USPTO Director.
C. Deference to the Judiciary and Separationof Powers
In interpreting the statutes, it is reasonable to consider the
deference that ought to be granted to the federal judiciary in
determining which procedures are best employed to decide cases and
render justice. It has been the traditional understanding that it is
within a court's authority to limit the "publication" of a decision. 174
Congress has generally deferred and given courts the power and
authority to issue a decision as either a "published" decision or an
"unpublished" decision. Absent a potential constitutional concern, such
as due process, federal courts generally are given wide discretion in this
area.
The principle of deference to courts about how they operate and
fulfill their judicial obligations is rooted in separation-of-powers
concerns. Deference to the judiciary and separation-of-powers concerns
are further reasons to construe § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) as not requiring
a mandatory written opinion.
Congress has traditionally been
deferential with respect to imposing procedural requirements on the
federal judiciary. As noted earlier, since the enactment of the Rules
Enabling Act, Congress has had little to say with respect to federal
172.
35 U.S.C. § 144 (2018).
173.
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 315 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943)).
174.
Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Precedent, JudicialPower, and the Constitutionalityof "NoCitation" Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2002) ("Limited
publication of judicial decisions was the accepted course of practice for the Framers, and no one
has seriously questioned the ability of courts to determine which of their decisions are fit for
publication."); see also Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2000).
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court rules, and Congress has generally delegated all procedural
rulemaking to the courts.17 5
Further, there is a long history of courts issuing opinions
without any meaningful explanation of the court's decision, other than
that the court fails to see any reversible error. For instance, the US
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit grants "summary affirmances"
which provide no more reasoning than what can be inferred from a Rule
36 affirmance:
Christopher Maddox Mossburg appeals the district court's order dismissing his
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We have reviewed the record and
find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, we affirm for the ieasons stated by the district court. ... We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 17in6
the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

The Federal Circuit has done so on occasion:
In light of our decision in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), we
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment that these claims are invalid
under 35 USC § 101. Dr. Classen's claims are neither "tied to a particular machine
or apparatus" nor do they "transform[| a particular article into a different state or
177

thing." . . . Therefore we affirm.

These two examples highlight important issues if one was to
conclude that § 144 requires the Federal Circuit to write an opinion in
all USPTO appeals. Congress has apparently not seen any deficiency
with such short opinions. Two- or three-sentence opinions stating
affirmance with one or two other points do not seem to have bothered
Congress.
Moreover, if the mandatory written opinion with reasons
requirement were correct, it would require either the Supreme Court or
Congress to assess whether the Federal Circuit's opinions satisfy any
statutory written opinion requirement. Would an opinion be statutorily
sufficient if it merely stated, "The decision of the Board is affirmed for
one or more of the reasons set forth in the Board's decision"? A major
administrability issue arises for any statute requiring a court to issue
an opinion with reasons because the statute requires some assessment
of whether the court's opinion is sufficiently detailed to satisfy the
statutory mandate. This would be an extraordinary shift from the
deference Congress has traditionally afforded the federal courts in
Much has been written about the extent to which Congress can delegate rulemaking
175.
authority to the federal judiciary. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the
Inherent-Powers Corollary,and Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1391 (2017).
Mossburg v. Maryland, 676 F. App'x 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2017), affd per curiam, No.
176.
8:15-cv-01633-RWT (D. Md. June 29, 2016) (citation omitted) (unpublished).
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App'x 866, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
177.
(citation omitted) (unpublished).
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deciding cases and managing its docket, and it would likely lead to
satellite litigation concerning the sufficiency of the Federal Circuit's
decision unrelated to the merits of the case. 178
D. The Legislative History Shows That Congress Did Not Intend to
Eliminate Affirmance Under FederalRule of Appellate Procedure36
Finally, this Article turns to the legislative history, including the
purpose of the statutory amendments. While the legislative history is
thin, it does not support a conclusion that § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) were
intended to impose a "written opinion with reasons" requirement on the
Federal Circuit in all appeals from the USPTO. Instead, the legislative
history confirms that the amendment was little more than a technical
amendment, intended to conform Federal Circuit procedure for USPTO
appeals with the standard practice in all appeals.
The most relevant legislative history dates back to just after the
creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA).17 9 Section 163 of FCIA included
conforming amendments specifically, "strik[e] out 'Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof
'Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."' 180 It also specifically made
those amendments to "[sjections 141 through 146 of title 35, United
States Code." 181 The same amendment was made to "the section
analysis of chapter 13 of title 35, United States Code" and the heading
for § 141.182 Thus, when the Federal Circuit was established, Congress
did not substantively amend § 144. At that time, § 144 was the same
as it was written in the 1952 Patent Act. 183
178.
See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 146 P.3d 547, 559 (Cal. 2006); People v. Rojas, 173 Cal. Rptr.
64, 68 (1981).
179.
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); see
also STEVEN FLANDERS, THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT-A JUDICIAL INNOVATION: ESTABLISHING A US

COURT OF APPEALS 2, 77 (2010); Daniel J. Meador, Retrospective on the Federal Circuit: The First
20 Years-A HistoricalView, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 557, 558-59 (2001); Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the
FederalCircuit:A PersonalAccount, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 581, 588-90 (1992).
180.
§ 163, 96 Stat. at 49.
181.
Id. § 163(a)(7).
182.
§ 163(b)(1)-(2), 96 Stat. at 49-50.
183.
See 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2018). Section 144, as enacted in the 1952 Patent Act, was based
on R.S. 4914, which read as follows: "The court, on petition, shall hear and determine such appeal,
and revise the decision appealed from in a summary way, on the evidence produced before the
commissioner, at such early and convenient time as the court may appoint; and the revision shall
be confined to the points set forth in the reasons of appeal. After hearing the case the court shall
return to the commissioner a certificate of its proceedings and decision, which shall be entered of
record in the Patent Office, and shall govern the further proceedings in the case. But no opinion
or decision of the court in any such case shall preclude any person interested from the right to
contest the validity of such patent in any court wherein the same way may be called into question."
Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, ch. 950, § 144, 66 Stat. 792, 802-03 (1952).
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After the Federal Circuit was created, Congress followed quickly
1
relatively minor tweaks to the controlling statutes. 8 On
some
with
November 8, 1984, Congress enacted the Technical Amendments to the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (Technical Amendments
Act).18 5

On August 4, 1983, Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier
introduced H.R. 3824, a bill titled Technical Amendments to the
Federal Courts Improvements Act. 186 The bill was intended make
certain technical modifications to the FCIA. The statutory revisions in
the Technical Amendments to the Federal Courts Improvement Act
focused on the then-requirement that certified copies of the record from
USPTO proceedings had to be transmitted to the Federal Circuit. Chief
Judge Markey explained that doing away with this requirement would
8
reduce cost to litigants, courts, and the public.
One other change was a proposed amendment to § 144. As
originally proposed, the amendment to § 144 read as follows:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the decision
from which an appeal is taken on the evidence produced before the Patent and
Trademark Office and transmitted to the court under section 143 of this title. Upon
its determination the court shall return to the Commissioner a certificate of its

proceedings and decision, which shall be entered of record in the Patent and
188
Trademark Office and shall govern the further proceedings in the case.

The proposed amendment included analogous wording for
trademark appeals. 189 Notably, the proposed amendment to § 144
retained the "shall return to the Commissioner a certificate of its
proceedings and decision" language that existed in § 144 since 1952.190
On September 28, 1983, the subcommittee held hearings on the
proposed bill. The hearings included three witnesses: Chief Judge
Markey; Rene Tegtmeyer, Assistant Commissioner for Patents; and
Stuart E. Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the
19
Department of Justice's Civil Division. 1
Chief Judge Markey noted the general basis for the amendment:
When the Act was under consideration, the focus was not directed to appeals from
the Patent and Trademark Office, jurisdiction of which merely transferred over from
the former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The provisions governing such

184.

See 1983 Hearing, supra note 170, at 1.

Technical Amendments to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
185.
98-620, 98 Stat. 3362 (1984).
H.R. 3824, 98th Cong. 1 (1983).
186.
187.

See 1983 Hearing, supra note 170, at 5.

188.
189.
190.

See H.R. 3824 at 3; 1983 Hearing, supra note 170, at 34.
See H.R. 3824 at 4.
Id. at 3.

191.

1983 Hearing,supra note 170, at iii.
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"Upon its determination the court shall issue to the Commissioner its mandate and
opinion.
These proposed revisions are the very amendments that would end up in § 144 and
§ 1071(a)(4) as the purported 'mandatory written opinion with reasons' language.
The revision was being offered solely to make appeals from the USPTO consistent
19 5
with appeals from the other tribunals."

Indeed, in his prepared remarks, Chief Judge Markey noted the
desire to make appeals uniform in procedure:
No pride of authorship resides in the foregoing recommendations, Mr. Chairman.
We believe, however, that such revisions would make the same expeditious
procedures available to those filing appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office
as are available to those filing appeals from the other 113 tribunals from which
19 6
appeals may be taken to the court.

Based on this statement, Chief Judge Markey's apparent
intention behind his proposed revision to H.R. 3824 was to make
appeals from the USPTO as similar as possible to appeals from "the
197 While his remarks
other 113 tribunals" (i.e., the district courts).
appear primarily directed more to the issue of certified records, the
comments evince a general intent to make the appeals process the
To read the proposed
same, regardless of the subject matter.
amendment as creating a special "written opinion" requirement for
USPTO appeals would run counter to Chief Judge Markey's
comments.198
Rene Tegtmeyer, Assistant Commissioner for Patents, also
testified. As with Chief Judge Markey, Mr. Tegtmeyer's remarks were
primarily directed to the "certification of the record" but nevertheless
199
included other comments and proposed revisions to the bill.
Mr. Tegtmeyer provided "copies of 35 USC 143 and 144 and 15
USC 1071(a)(3) and (4) marked-up to reflect this change as well as
minor editorial suggestions," 2 00 which are produced in Figures 2 and 3:

Id. at 8.
195.
See id. at 9
196.
Id.
197.
See id. at 5 ("The suggested amendments also have the benefit of making appeals to
198.
the court, from all of the 116 tribunals from which appeals may be taken, identical.").
Id. at 15.
199.
Id. at 17.
200.
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Figure 2. Redlined Copy of 35 U.S.C. § 144
"§144.

Decision on appeal

'The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the
evidence produced before the Patent and Trademark Office.
[and
bes ibd bo -ae~s
t
c-e-ke. 3 Upon its
determination the court shall
treenj
issue to the Commissioner (atitO+~
end
] its
mandate and
opinion which shall be entered of record in the Patent and Trademark
Office and shall
govern the further
proceedings in the case."

Figure 3. Redlined Copy of 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4)
"(4)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall review the decision from which the appeal is taken on the
(ev
ee-ptrdfej record before the Patent and 'irademark Office.

Maesson9.] Upon its determination the court shall [s.et..Usa) issue
its mandate to the Comrissioner [i- .
r-Ak0ia
t_-iepr;oceed
a>-4ee
**-,) which shall be entereo of record in the Patent and
Trademark Office and snall govern the further proceedings in the
case."
201

According to Mr. Tegtmeyer, "[t]he proposed revision of 35 USC
144 obviously flows with the change to 35 USC 142."202 His comment
here does not appear to be referring to the amendment that would
include the so-called opinion requirement because § 142 relates only to
the notice of appeal.
Mr. Tegtmeyer further stated: "[W]e would concur completely in
the proposed revisions that Chief Judge Markey presented in his
testimony and in his prepared statement. Our own proposed revisions
follow or track his identically." 203 From this statement, the USPTO
similarly did not view the amendment to § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) as
adding a new requirement that the Federal Circuit was required to
write an opinion in every appeal from the USPTO. Instead, the purpose
of the amendments was to make the appeal process uniform.
Rather, understanding § 144 as a transmittal requirement is
also supported by the language of § 144 prior to the 1984 amendment.
The earlier version of the statute instructed that the court "shall return
to the Commissioner a certificate of its proceedings and decision." 204

201.
202.
203.

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.

204.

See H.R. 3824 at 3.
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The old imperative was to send a certificate of the Court's decision to
the USPTO. The objective was presumably to inform the USPTO of the
outcome of the appeal, ensure that subsequent USPTO proceedings
would be conducted in accordance with the outcome, and conform
Federal Circuit practice with the practice of other appellate courts.
Finally, the legislative history includes remarks from Mr.
Schiffer, which primarily focused on jurisdictional issues but also
included comments about the proposed revisions to § 144 and
§ 1071(a)(4) 205:
Section 4(a) of the bill amends sections 142, 143 and 144 of Title 35. These sections
deal with appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office in patent cases. The
amendments conform these sections to the usual procedure for taking appeals to the

circuit courts. Section 4(b) of the bill amends sections 21(a)(2), (3) and (4) of the
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(2), (3) and (4)), which deal with appeals from the
Patent and Trademark Office in trademark cases. The proposed amendments are
identical to those proposed in section 4(a) for patent cases. Section 4(c) of the bill
makes section 4(a) and 4(b) applicable to cases pending in the Patent and Trademark
Office and in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

206

Consistent with the above, the Department of Justice viewed the
amendments as making the appeal process uniform. In the Department
of Justice's view, the amendments simply "conform[ed] these sections
[including § 144] to the usual procedure for taking appeals to the circuit
courts." 2 0 7 This testimony supports the conclusion that the amendment
was not intended to impose a new, unique requirement on the Federal
Circuit to write an opinion in every appeal from the USPTO. Nor is
there evidence of intent to restrict the applicability of FRAP 36.
In the Sectional Analysis of H.R. 3824, the purpose of making
the appeal process uniform was once again noted:
Section 4(a) of the bill amends sections 142, 143 and 144 of Title 35, United States
Code. These sections deal with appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office in
patent cases. The amendments conform these sections to the usual procedure for
taking appeals to the circuit courts. Section 4(b) of the bill amends sections 21(a)(2),
(3) and (4) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(2), (3) and (4)), which deal with
appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office in trademark cases. The proposed
208
amendments are identical to those proposed in section 4(a) for patent cases.

After the subcommittee hearing, on October 26, 1983, Representative
H.R. 4222 included the
Kastenmeier introduced H.R. 4222.209
amendment to Section 144 as first proposed by Chief Judge Markey:

205.

1983 Hearing, supra note 170, at 24-31.

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 36-37.
H.R. 4222, 98th Cong. 1 (1983); 1983 Hearing,supra note 170, at 72.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the decision
from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office.
Upon its determination the court shall issue to the Commissioner its mandate and
opinion, which shall be entered of record in the Patent and Trademark Office and
shall govern the further proceedings in the case. 2 10

Based on this legislative history, the precise language in § 144
and § 1071(a)(4) is traceable directly to Chief Judge Markey. After the
revised bill H.R. 4222 was introduced, Representative Kastenmeier
solicited the comments of Judge Giles Rich of the Federal Circuit. 211 By
letter dated January 16, 1984, Judge Rich replied. 212 His comments
responded primarily to the revision that eliminated the need to file a
"reasons of appeal" contained in 35 U.S.C. § 142-144 at the time. 213
Judge Rich noted that this "reasons of appeal" requirement had already
been eliminated from trademark appeals. 2 14
Judge Rich also noted that the proposed amendments to the
trademark statutes include § 1071(a)(4):
I note that your H.R. 4222, Sec. 4(b), contains revisions to the trademark statute, 15
USC 1071(a) (2), (3), and (4) but clearly that is for reasons other than the abolition
of reasons of appeal, which is now an accomplished fact. One such reason I assume
to be the change in the name of the court from the CCPA to the CAFC, or "Fed.
2

Cir." 15

Again, Judge Rich did not appear to view the amendment to

§ 144 and § 1071(a)(4) as imposing a new, unique requirement on the
court that it must, in every instance, prepare a written opinion with
reasons for its decision.
Judge Rich's letter confirms the
nonsubstantive nature of the amendment to § 144. Moreover, nothing
in Judge Rich's letter indicates any suggestion that the amendment was
intended to limit the applicability of FRAP 36.
In November 1984, the Technical Amendments to the Federal
Court Improvements Act of 1982 was enacted into law. 216 No further
amendments relevant to the present issue were made to the bill prior
to its passage into law.
From the above review of the legislative history, several general
observations can be made. First, nothing in the legislative history
indicates that the amendments were intended to impose a new, unique
"mandatory written opinion with reasons" requirement on the Federal
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
No. 98-620,

H.R. 4222 at 3; 1983 Hearing, supra note 170, at 74.
1983 Hearing, supra note 170, at 151.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.
See Technical Amendments to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
98 Stat. 3362 (1984).
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Second, the primary thrust of the
Circuit for USPTO appeals.
non-substantive
thus
procedural-and
were
amendments
amendments, which is consistent with a bill styled as a "technical
amendment." Third, the expressed purpose of the amendments was to
increase uniformity to the appeal process, not to impose a unique
Indeed, as the subcommittee explained, "The
requirement.
amendments conform these sections to the usual procedure for taking
217
appeals to the circuit courts to make the appeal process uniform."
Finally, there is no indication in the legislative history that the
statutory amendment to § 144 was intended to codify the Federal
Circuit's prior Local Rule 18(a) (which had been in place from 1984 to
1986). As noted above, former Federal Circuit Rule 18(a), in place at
the time of the amendment to § 144, was the court's own rule that
specified that appeals would result in either a published or
nonpublished opinion. The legislative history has no hint that Congress
sought to codify old Federal Circuit Rule 18(a). One would expect that
Chief Judge Markey or someone else involved in the legislation would
make at least one remark reflecting an intent to impose a legislative
opinion-writing requirement if that were the intent. Overall, it would
have been a highly unusual proposition for Congress to impose a specific
statutory amendment that was already addressed by the court's local
rule, particularly given the scope of FRAP 36.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the statutory text, the legislative history, the
historical context, the purpose behind the legislative amendments to
§ 144 and § 1071(a)(4), and the governing rules of appellate procedurenot to mention the deference traditionally granted to the judiciary-all
lead to the conclusion that the most reasonable statutory interpretation
is that § 144 and § 1071(a)(4) do not prohibit the Federal Circuit from
utilizing Rule 36 affirmances to dispose of appeals from the USPTO.
If the opposite theory were correct, the Federal Circuit would
substantially revise its management of cases. Namely, if Rule
to
have
36 affirmances were not permitted, the court would have to devote
resources to writing opinions in cases that do not meaningfully add to
patent and trademark jurisprudence. And if that is the result, resource
constraints beg the question of whether the court will have to reduce its
efforts in other areas, such as offering oral argument in every
represented case or writing detailed opinions for pro se appellants. The
court could resort to issuing one-paragraph affirmances, as it has done
217.

1983 Hearing,supra note 170, at 29.
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on occasion and which would be similar to the current practice of other
courts of appeals.
To be clear, the legal question of whether Rule 36 affirmances
are permitted under the applicable laws and rules is distinct from the
normative question of whether Rule 36 affirmances should be used in
affirming USPTO decisions. The latter question is complex and draws
upon a long history of judicial and academic debate, including the
history associated with "published" versus "unpublished" opinions.
Rule 36 affirmances undoubtedly rankle many in the patent bar-and
the legal community in general. These one-word affirmances also run
against courts' general, historical practice of providing some
explanation of their decisions. But Rule 36 affirmances provide distinct
benefits-to the court, the litigants, and the public.2 18
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit is well within its statutory
authority to issue Rule 36 affirmances. For parties who disagree with
the court's use of Rule 36 and seek to limit it, those parties' efforts would
be better spent focusing on the policy reasons why the court should
write opinions-even short ones-in as many appeals as possible.

218.
See Matthew J. Dowd, Banning Rule 36 Affirmances: Be Careful What You Ask For,
LAW360 (Aug. 25, 2017, 12:02 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/956672/banning-rule-36affirmances-be-careful-what-you-ask-for [https://perma.cc/JE59-V5VZ].

